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INTRODUCTION
A M ethodoloE ical N ote
I n additionto being a study on contemporaryC hinese
social thought , the present theses is also meant to be an exercise
in intellectualhistory . Y et to say that one adopts an intellectual
history approach, echoingS tuart H ughes , is to have said nothing,
until one has clarifiedthe meaningof the term ( HUGHES, 1 9 5 0 ) .
S ociologists, in their endeavoursto understandthe different
social forces underlyinga society , customarilyresort to the
analytic framework as offered by the sociology of knowledge whenever
the realm of mental productionbecomesinvolved. A s B rinton has
. suggested, there is in fact a very close relationshipbetween the
two areas of intellectualhistory and sociology of knowledge, both
striving to look into the relation between an idea and its content
( BRINTON, 1 9 6 8 ) .
T hat ideas do have a relationshipwith their context is
already a familiar belief . R . G . C ollingwoodhas suggestedthat
all historyis the historyof ideas ( COLLINGWOOD, 1 9 4 6 ) , and ,
along the same vein yet in a different direction , W hitehead maintained
that our history of ideas is defined by our ideas of history
( WHITEHEAD, 1 9 3 3 ) . I n thus maintainingthe close affinitybetween
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ideas and history, theme two thinkers are but reiterating the
age-old belief that thought and act each have an important roLe
to play in the mutual shaping of each other. This much no one
would dispute. What could not be settled, however, is the extent
and nature of this role, and how this mutual influence comes
about in reality. It is to the resolution of this problem that
both the sociology of knowledge and intellectual history address
themselves.
Although the approach as offered by the sociology of
knowledge may be more readily manageable for students of sociology,
yet the present study has deliberately switched to work in a
intellectual history framework. This is because the sociology of
knowledge approach has in it certain limitations which render it
inappropriate for the present purpose. The distinctiveness of a
sociology of knowledge lies in the analysts' conscientiousness in
relating the development of a body of ideas to the wider social
dynamic. Basically, the position is that "ideas and knowledge are
bound to a location within the social structure and the historical
process" (MERTON, 1950). However, social thinkers and philosophers
differ a great deal with regard to which specific sectors within
the social structure the ideas and knowledge are located in or
subsequently even determined by. The question involved here,
when stretched to its extreme, produces unwitting ideological
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implications which have loomed large throtuchout the whole process
of the development of the sociology of knowledge. In identifying
the societal forces affecting the generation of knowledge, the
analytic tools offered by the sociology of knowledge have become
weapons for thinkers of various political leanings to discredit
other competing systems of thought. Thus, for Marx, ideas and
knowledge are ultimately determined by economic and class factors.
This postulation then enables him to attack the bourgeoisie's
worldview as a certain false consciousnesses, for, as he maintained,
the class position of the bourgeoisie stands not at the centre,
but at the periphery of society. Marx's right-wing critics, such
as Karl Mannheim, likewise attempt to discover the social determinants
behind ideas and knowledge, aiming at least implicitly at a
reinterpretation or even a rejection of the Marxian frame of
analysis. For Mannheim, knowledge is by no means wholly determined
by economic and class factors. In addition to these, Mannheim also
identified generation, occupation, and status etc, as factors which
would also contribute to the determination of the nature and direction
of knowledge. In the same vein, Max Weber also suggested class,
status, and power as the three factors affecting the orientation
of ideas and the individual. Implicitly, what Weber and Mannheim
attempt to do is to soften the revolutionary tone in the original
Marxian formulation, to the effect that no individual or group
4can have claims toJa superior or objective knowledge of man and
society than other individuals or groups.
In these classic formulations of the sociology of knowledge,
then, there has all along been infused an ideological spirit, which
has largely weakened its status as a set of analytic tools. If
there is no attempt to reaffirm the various ideological positions
expounded by either right-wing or left-wing sociologists, the
sociology of knowledge has then very little to offer. This, in a
nutshell, is one of the most important difficulties facing Marx,
Weber, Mannheim, and their respective followers. Thus, before the
relative truths of these positions can be determined, we need first
of all a more impartial understanding of the nature of the relation-
ship between ideas and social structure. It is for this reason that
intellectual history could serve as a corrective for the more
inflexible sociology of knowledge. An exception to this general
picture may be the more philosophical and consequently more periphery
version of the sociology of knowledge as practiced by the phenomenologists
Max Scheler and Alfred Schultz. Yet their positions have more interest
for epistemologists rather than for sociologists and as such may not
be of immediate concern to our purpose here.
Yet there is a deeper, more intrinsic reason which may
explain why the sociology of knowledge has developed into a number
of ideological inclinations instead of remaining a more scientifically-
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based analytical framework. For all along, no sociologist has
really been able to define and identify any independent variable
which could be proved to be necessary and adequate factors for
explaining the growth and development of mental productions.
This inability holds true even for the more recent developments
of the sociology of knowledge. For though the analysts may have
admittedly refined their initial points of departure and employing
more rigorous research method, yet basically no significant break
from the shadow of the Marx-Mannheim tradition has taken place.
Ultimately, facing with virtually unlimited possibilities of
seemingly significant societal factors, and yet with the black-box
of the human mind remaining impenetrable, it is thus natural for an
analyst to fall back on his own faith and predispositions, regardless
of how unviable these might be scientifically speaking.
In other words, where the sociologists of knowledge have
failed is in being unable to pull ideas and mental productions all
the way down from a more abstract and unpalpable realm and pin them
down to their corresponding social structure r The jump from abstract
ideas to concrete reality has been such a great leap that most
analysts have only managed to fill up the gap in between with
conjectures or beliefs of one kind or another. Theoretically
speaking, then, what is needed is the construction of intermediate
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categories, which would be more closely related to both the
mental productions and the societal infrastructures concerned, and
which could thus serve as some kinds of bridges or waystations to
link up, step by step, ideas and social structure. To conquer the
limitations of the sociology of knowledge, then, the search for
such intermediate categories becomes an immediate tasks,
Yet not every sociologist feels obliged to look at it
this way. Instead, the ideological implications of the sociology
of knowledge have become handy weapons the manipulation of which
is almost part of the trade. The first sociologist to reflect on
the limitations of the sociology of knowledge along these lines
was Pitrim Sorokin. In contradistinction to the Mannheimian approach,
he practised a more ideational version of the sociology of knowledge.
For Sorokin, ideas and knowledge themselves are but part of the
socio-cultural dynamics. in this sense, the Marx-Weber-Mannheim
tradition has been on the wrong track in opposing knowledge with
social structure. If a body of knowledge is in one way or another
influenced by the socio-cultural dynamics at large, it is more
likely that other bodies of knowledge would be the more important
source of impetus than factors standing more aloof from the
ideational order. The socio-cultural environment of a body of ideas
necessarily includes other ideas. It is these other ideas, being
7part of the same societal category as the idea in question, which
would be more directly influential, much more so than other techno-
economic or socio-structural factors. Thus, in discussing Sorokin's
sociology of knowledge, Jacques Maquet remarked that "instead of
an absolute separation, there is rather an unbroken continuity
from the facts of observation to the principles of metaphysics"
(MAQUET, 1951). And, in explaining his own position as regards
the source and influences underlying a body of knowledge, Sorokin
himself says: Of the two interdependent variables, cultural and
social, I chose the cultural factors as the more fruitful or more
important one that accounts for a given state of science, as well
as philosophy, religion, ethics, law, fine arts, polity, economy,
and social theories. This means that each of these cultural systems
is more decisively determined by the rest of the cultural systems
and supersystems than by the social structures of the respective
groups having-these cultural systems and supersystems (SORCKIN, 1963).
Whereas Professor Mannheim has sought to trace out the specific
connections between actual interest groups in society and the ideas
and modes of thought they espoused (WIRT H, 1936), Sorokin would
maintain that though "co-operation of the cultural and the social
types of Wissensoziologie is necessary for adequate cognition of
socio-cultural reality, of these two types the cultural Wissensoziologie
is more important and more fruitful than the social Wissensoziologie"
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(SOROKIN, 1963). In this way, Sorokin departs from the classical
tradition of the sociology of knowledge and seeks to identify his
own source of knowledge from the super-structural, ideational
components of society.
The position of Sorokin is highly enlightening in helping
to escape from the Mannheimian straitjacket. His novelty lies in
his insistence that other bodies of knowledge are also part of the
socio-cultural environment of a body of ideas, and are thus a
legitimate and also significant area of enquiry for the sociology
of knowledge. In this way, instead of dichotomize society into
super/infra structures, or technological/ideational orders, Sorokin
reconstructs the continuity among different social categories,
resulting more or less in a social continuum which diffuses gradually
from one structure or polarity into another. The relationship
between abstract knowledge and concrete social structures is therefore
not one of direct determination, but a relationship mediated by other
social categories of different degrees of abstractness or concreteness.
The straitjacket of social determination in the Mannheimian tradition
can then be avoided. Before knowledge can be understood in social
structural terms, it is then important to clarify it first by under-
standing it in other, may be less abstract, ideational terms. This
is the main lesson from Pitrim Sorokin which we forget at our own
risk.
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Starting from the Sorokian position, it is only a short
step into an intellectual history approach. Sorokin comes close
to advocating that, in order to have a sociological understanding
of knowledge, it is first necessary to reconstruct the mutual
influences and interdependences between bodies of knowledge. It
is therefore natural, from his vantage point, to cross over the
threshold of the sociology of knowledge and recast it in the mould
of what is commonly regarded as intellectual history-. Sociologists
with a more dogmatic outlook may consider Sorokin's formulation as
a step backward from sociology, to once again subordinating
sociological analysis under historical studies. In essence, however,
Sorokin's position constitutes rather a breakthrough in both of the
disciplines concerned. Instead of giving overwhelming stress to
either the socio-structural factors or the ideational factors,
ultimately Sorokin is asking for a mode of enquiry which could
include the two polarities of the same social continuum. In this
way, approaches from both the sociology of knowledge and intellectual
history can become synthesised. While both the sociology of knowledge
and intellectual history attempt to discover the relationship between
an idea and its context, the approach of intellectual history by
definition does not have to be confined to the social structural
context of an idea. It can therefore free itself from the ideological
heritages embedded in the sociology of knowledge. In this way, the
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investigator may be equipped with a freer hand and a broader
horizon for locating the factors which lurk behind an idea
system.
If a comparision is made between the sociology of
knowledge and intellectual history, therefore, the latter has
several advantages over the former. Firstly, as has been noted
above, intellectual history stretches the context of idea beyond
the more restricted scope of social structural factors, and can thus
examine the context of ideas in more comprehensive terms. Secondly,
by the use of a mode of historical analysis, the context of an idea
is also stretched along its temporal dimension in intellectual
history. The changes over time are taken into account to allow
for a more dynamic relationship between the ideas and their contexts.
Thirdly, intellectual history aims primarily to disentangle the
various questions raised by the body of ideas concerned. It is
therefore oriented more towards reconstructing the domain assumptions
(Gouldner) or the root metaphors (Richard Brown) of an idea, and
indicating how this domain assumption or root metaphor is shared by
or originated from other social categories. Being centered on the
body of ideas itself, intellectual history therefore largely avoids
the danger of prematurely conjecturing on the possible repercussion
or the relative merits of a body of ideas, and thus stands farther
apart from ideological conflicts.
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Yet intellectual history, as a form of generalised
substitute for the sociology of knowledge, is not without its
own problems. To the extent that it is able to overcome the
rigidity of a sociology of knowledge, it at time's tends to be
over flexible and become not much more than a blanket term for
a set of indefinite subject matters. It is in this sense that
Stuart Hughes would have argued the importance of terminological
clarification if meaning is to be attached to the nominal label
of an intellectual history. As Brinton wisely point out, "intel-
lectual history is an adventure of idea for anyone who will embark
on it-- but all adventures imply uncertainty" (BRINTON, 1963).
To clarify the meaning of intellectual history as a mode
of enquiry, it might be helpful to first differentiate, with R.G.
Collingwood, between the inner and the outer dimensions of human
affairs. By inner dimension, Collingswood is referring to the
unobservable motives, thought, or ideas which underly the outer,
i.e. the overt and observable, dimension of human activities
(COLLINGWOOD, 1946). Intellectual historians largely agree among
themselves that it is their task to deal with the inner dimensions
of human affairs. Yet beyond this point, their consensus stops
short. Of this inner dimension,- Stuart Hughes further differentiate
between a higher and a lower set of subject matter, referring more
or less to the high culture and popular culture respectively, and
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chooses to concentrate his attention on the former (HUGHES, 1950).
His position is shared by many other scholars, among them Robert
Merton, who designates the analysis of more sophisticated knowledge
and ideas as the task of intellectual historians and sociologists
of knowledge. As for the cruder, more unrefined ideas of everyday
life, the analysis of them is presumably the task of communication
theorists (MERTON, 1950).
Yet this position is confronted by other fellow intellectual
historians of different inclinations. Thus, Crane Brinton, for one,
maintains that the whole spectrum of knowledge and mental production
of men provides an equally dignified set of subject matters for an
intellectual historian. He suggests that an intellectual historian
worthy of his name should presumably be simultaneously a historian
of philosophy and a social historian, encompassing within himself
abstract ideas of the highest order and the mundane, everyday ideas
of common man (BRINTON, 1963).
Sensitive observers could certainly detect that the
contradiction between these two stands is actually an unnecessary
ones If the whole spectrum of. knowledge should be regarded as
legitimate subject matter for intellectual history, there is no
reason why each intellectual historian should not follow his own
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leaning and select his own special area or level of anaiysis.
The ideal of an all-round intellectual historian must remain an
ideal, for quite obviously the spectrum of mental production can
by no means be embraced by any single investigator. It might be
more fruitful to interpret Brinton's stance as a helpful reminder
in rescuing the more mundane ideas back into the camp of intellectual
history.
Other than differences in the delineation of subject matter,
the question as regards the appropriate orientation of intellectual
history also causes some confusions. Under the same effort to relate
a particular inner happening to a context of other happenings that
explain them, John Higham distinguishes between an internal approach
and an external approach (HIGHAM, 1952). In the first case, the
approach is chiefly directed to "the uncovering of relation between
what some men write or say and what other men write or say". While
in the second case the orientation leads outward to external wants
and behaviour". A.O. Love joy and Crane Brinton are cited by Higham
as respectively the chief proponents of these different orientations.
As Higham himself points out, the difference between these two
approaches is really one of a difference in perspectives as regards
the role of ideas in actual historical process. For the external
approach, mind is taken as functional, and "acquires its meaning
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only in the realm of actions", while for the. internal approach,
mind has a meaning intrinsic to itself, which reaches beyond
practical. needs to create a world of values and achievements which
have their own excuses for being". It must be pointed out, however,
that unlike the analogical development in the sociology of knowledge
which has been discussed earlier, in intellectual history this
distinction between an internal and an external approach is more
heuristic, analytic, than real. In actuality, pure types of
approach neither exist or are emphasised. Instead, intellectual
historians of different orientations tend to strike a synthesis
between these two approaches according to their own personal
emphases. Even Brinton and Lovejoy themselves have been less than
faithful to the respective approaches they claim to advocate. Both
have found it necessary to incorporate some elements of the
supposedly opposing approach. There is a lesson to be learnt,
however, from these different emphases in formulating what is an
appropriate orientation for intellectual history. If Brinton has
stressed the meaning of ideas in terms of their functional consequences,
he is simply arguing against any sweeping assertions of the primacy
of ideas in history. And when Lovejoy focuses on the intrinsic
values, of ideas, he is but objecting to any effort which debases
ideas into passive echos of events (HIGHAM, 1952). Each intellectual
historian must therefore beware of these dangers, and structure
his synthesis accordingly.
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If the aforegoing discussion has to some degree clarified
the subject matter and orientations of intellectual history, it
still remains to discuss the actual approaches adopted in the
writing of intellectual histories. Basically, the problem involved
here is to identify certain units of analysis for the intellectual
historians. Ideas do not possess an intrinsic form. Their reality
very much depends on their embodiment or objectivation through men,
books, or sometimes works art. Moreover, though scholars customarily
talk about 'idea' or 'ideas', as if mental productions can be clear-
out and readily delineated into calculable units, in reality, ideas
merge and diffuse into each other, resulting in a labyrinth of
utterings not easily susceptible to disentanglement.
Thus, any intellectual historian, when facing his field
of enquiry, encounters several possibilities. Firstly, the materials
he employs could be either the men or their works. And secondly,
he could choose to study either one idea or many. Again, matters
of.degree these differentiations may be, yet they are nevertheless
genuine methodological problems a, researcher must settle before he
can launch his own investigation.
By classifying intellectual histories along the two
dimensions of men-work, idea-ideas, it is possible to identify five
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different types of iiitellectual history: 1. the unit idea
approach; 2. the thematic approach; 3. the cultural current
approach; 4. intellectual biography; 5. multipie intellectual
biography. If an intellectual historian has chosen to focus on
the works or other productions as a more faithful embodiment of the
ideas in question, he could follow the first three approaches, all
of which focus on the embodiment of ideas in books or other produc-
tions, rather than the personal experiences of the figure concerned.
Their differences with each other are a question of magnitude,
embracing areas of different scope. Likewise, for the intellectual
historians who feel that men are better representations of ideas
than books could choose to follow the last two, more personal,
psychological, approaches, which aim at to study one figure or more.
These different approaches differ from each other both in kind and
in scope. It is therefore natural that they should differ also in
the relative contributions they can make in unravelling the relation-
ship between an idea and its context.
The unit-idea approach is strongly advocated. by people like
A.O. Lovejoy and his associates at the Journal of the History or Idea.s.
For Lovejoy, the unit idea approach of intellectual history is similar
to analytic chemistry, that it cuts into the hard and fast individual
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systems and, for its own purpose, breaks them up into their
component elements, into what may be called their unit ideas"
(LOVEJOY, 1961). In other words, this approach emphasises on
the delineation or even reconstruction of the units of ideas
which have become infused into a compound of idea systems. To
illustrate this approach, we may cite as example the celebrated
work, The Great Chain of Being, by Lovejoy himself (LOVEJOY, 1961).
Anothergood example for the unit idea approach is J. Bury's The
Idea of Progress (BURY, 1932). Love joy's work is an investigation
into the conception of Being as one of the basic idea units which
underly the development of Western philosophical thought, while
Bury's work looks into the idea of Progress, and how it comes to
have an effect on contemporary social thought.
The thematic approach takes into consideration the specific
patterns of interaction between two or more unit ideas and their
evolution through time. What is at stake here is the clustering up
of a particular set of unit ideas in a certain historicity. To use
Lovejoy's analogy of analytic chemistry, if the unit-idea approach
looks into the basic elements contained in a chemical compound, the
thematic approach largely looks at the compound. The best examples
one could cite for intellectual histories of this approachis, of
course, the renowned trilogy by Stuart Hughes which insightfully
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records the development of certain Western intellectual themes
over the last half century. The first volume of the trilogy,
Consciousness and Society, studies the theme of the rediscovery
of the roleof human consciousness in the construction of a
worldview by philosophers, social thinkers, psychoanalysts etc.,
simultaneously at the turn of the twentieth century, resulting
in the germination of a whole set of new approaches and ideas
which drastically changed the orientation of European thinkers
towards society, man, and history (HUGHES, 1958). The two sequels,
The Obstructed Path and The Sea Change, develop from the consciousness
theme.,. and illustrate how a theme of thinking, in the process of
evolvement and modification, gives birth to other themes. In The
Obstructed Path, a book dealing with French social thought during
the years of the war and its aftermath, Hughes derives his theme
from the motif of relentless search-- a search for an ontological
sense of belonging which has become immanent in the face of a
depressing political reality (HUGHES, 1965). The Sea. Change, employing
the motif of relentless change, describes the parallel development
of intellectual currents simultaneously taking place at the other
shore of the ocean, in America. There, the convergence of European
intellectual ideas, as imported by the emigre scholars, and local
American culture, had led to a "sea change" for both the American
and European intellectual ideas concerned, a change into "something
beautiful and strange" (HUGHES, 1973).
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If the theme employed by an intellectual historian is
sufficiently broad, the resulting work could be no less than
dealing with the entire cultural current of the specific period
and area concerned, encompassing both the higher and the lower
sides of the ideas. Thus, the third approach to be discussed,
i.e. the cultural current approach, might almost be described
as the downward expansion of the thematic approach. Whereas the
thematic approach deals with the interaction between unit ideas,
the cultural current approach shows how the themes resulting
therefrom may also interact among themselves to give a larger,
more or less coherent whole. An outstanding example of this approach
would be Roger Shattuck's The Banquet Years, a study of the formation
of the avant garde spirit in Paris at the turn of the century.
Shattuck starts by identifying four different themes which gained
currency in that particular period: the cult of childhood, the
pervading note of humour, the erruption of dreams into reality, and
finally, a cast of ambiguity. Shattuck then shows how these
seemingly unrelated themes can be found to be actually united at
a deeper level of understanding, and how they become accountable
for the rise of the distinct cultural current known as the avant
garde, which not only affects the aesthetic expression of the high
culture, but seeps its way into the everyday world (SHATTUCK, 1969).
Another well known work dealing with the formation of a cultural
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current in Peter Gay'rs The Weimar Culture. In this study of the
cultural climate during the brief existence of the Weimar Republic
before the rise of Hitler, Gay managed to spin together the different
themes the interaction of which converged into an unique culture
which Gay characterised by a revolt of the son against the father,
and by a usurpation of the insiders by the outsiders (GAY, 1970).
Respectively, these two books illustrate how the different intellectual
themes underlying a place and time become incorporated into a wider
cultural frame of reference, in the form of a distinct cultural
currents
So far, the above discussion has focused on the different
types of intellectual history which deal more directly with the
ideas themselves, as embodied in books or other works produced in
a particular time or place. Another main approach to intellectual
history, however, deals with ideas through their exemplification
by the thinkers themselves both as scholars and as individuals.
This approachtherefore makes a more or less biographical, and
sometimes even psychologicalkind of analysis. The rationale behind
is-that ideas, as productions of the human mind., must be closely
related to the kind of experiences or life chances a man encountered.
In the expression of an idea or thought, a manes personality, beliefs,
predispositions etc. can be just as important as his publications
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or other works, if not even more so. This explains the effort
behind those intellectual histories characterised by biographical
or multiple-biographical methods. In these approaches, therefore,
men become the acknowledged actors for their own lives and thoughts
Intellectual biography differs from general biographical
studies in that it aims primarily to integrate thinker's life and
thought, hopingthereby that these two different dimensions would
illuminate each other. Ideas may not have an intrinsic form, yet
it could be argued that thinkers with different personality make-ups
do tend to be associated with styles of thoughts dissimilar in
orientation. The ways whereby ideas become embodied in men are by
no means arbitrary, but are on the contrary highly selective. By
studying the relationship between culture and its creators, it may
be more possible to further specify the sources and origin of
different styles of thought. For intellectual biography working
along this line, a vast literature could be cited. For instance,
Ernest Jones's The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud Marienne Weber's
Max Weber, a biography George Painter's Marcel Proust and also
Steven Lukes's Emile Durkheim. Each of these works, by looking into
the actual life chances facing' scientists, social thinkers, or
literary writers, describes how a man's worldview is shaped by
the vast complexity of experiences he encountered, which subsequently
determines the idiosyncracies of his thought. It is only by looking
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at the man as a whole that one may understand either Freud's
Weber's romantic rationalismprophetic scientism (JONES, 1961),
(WEBER, 1950), Durkheim's sociological determinism (LUKES, 1975),
or Proust's pathological obsession with a childhood which has
become transformed into a lost, and consequently real, paradise
(PAINTER, 1959).
Other than intellectual biography dealing with individual
thinkers, a popular genre in intellectual history would be the
multiple intellectual biography approach. The historian or biographer,
employing criteria specific to his own purpose, would juxtapose
together more than one man of ideas in his project, and study them
simultaneously. The choice may be for the obvious reason that
these figures are in fact associates with one another, like Marx
and Engels, or Horkheimer and Adorno. Yet it may also be for less
obvious reasons particular to the historian's own purpose. For
studies using the multiple intellectual biography approach, one
may cite as examples Fritz Stern's Politics of Cultural Despair,
E.H. Carr's The Romantic Exile, or, once again, Roger Shattuck's
The Banquet Years. Stern's book, deals with Legarde, Langhun,
and Moeller, the three prophets of doom in the last years of imperial
Germany, and how their prophecy ultimately becomes the source of
inspiration and justification for the National. Socialism of Hilter
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(STERN, 1968). Carr, on the other hand, studies three members
of the Russian intellegentsia, Herten, Bakunin, and Orgarev, who
had been forced into exile by Tsarist Russia. He therefore
focuses exclusively on this exile experience and the effect it
had on the development of their political ideals, instead of
dealing with their lives and works in their entirety (CARR, 1948).
Shattuck's The Banquet Years is once again cited as example. For,
though, ad discussed above, his book managed to illustrate how
different themes of thought interacted with each other to create
a cultural current, nevertheless Shattuck deals with these themes
by pinning them down on to three specific representative figures,
and analyses the relationship between these men, their ideas, and
the cultural current generated as a result. His work is therefor+
an outstanding synthesis of two major approaches, giving equal
stress to the complex of ideas and the men standing behind. In
this sense, The Banquet Years can also serve as reminder of the
tenuousness academic classification sometimes suffers from.
Of the different types of intellectual histories enumerated
in the aforegoing discussion,.the present study largely models
itself-after Shattuck and Stern, concentrating on a selected group
of intellectuals and hopefully indicating the intimate relationship
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between man, idea, and historicity. The multiple-biography
approach, for the present purpose here, has several strengths
over the others. Firstly, it allows for a more comprehensive
treatment of the intellectual actors and the ideas they enacted.
Secondly, by focusing on more than a single case, the multiple
biography approach can allow for certain degrees of generalization
beyond the particular actors and ideas concerned. By adopting
a largely comparative approach, the result of which could hopefully
contribute more readily to a theoretical understanding of the
intervention between ideas and its context. For our purpose here,
concentration will be on the different styles of thought rather
than life experiences. The scope of this study has largely ruled
out the psychological side of the picture. Yet it is understandable
that intellectual trajectory should in any case take precedence
over the actual events of social life. Though it can be argued
that such an approach tends to sacrifice depth for comprehensiveness,
yet, for our present purpose here, comprehensiveness does have
higher priority than depth, simply because, in the study of
contemporary Chinese social thought, the general ground has not
been laid yet to allow for more, indepth research. It is in part
to fulfill this task that the present endeavour may acquire its
meaning.
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To this point, quite deliberately the above discussion
has focused exclusively on methodological. issues, illustrated
by European materials. The idea is that it may help in preparing
some kind of background against which the Chinese case can be
compared and interpreted. If a more comprehensive, macroscopic
approach has been taken to be more appropriate, this is in response
to the confusions in the development of contemporary Chinese social
thought, and consequently the confusions in the scholarly efforts
spent on the study of this development. Such confusions pose
serious problems, not merely academic ones but also genuine problems
of everyday reality, especially to Chinese intellectuals. Though
the political dimension of ideas and thought should not be over-
stressed, yet in time of crisis and change, to echo Sorokin, ideas
can actually provide channels leading away from the dark alley of
history. To distangle the labyrinth of conflicting ideas in
contemporary China is thus essential in constructing a more thorough
understanding of Chinese civilization. It is in this sense that
Arthur Wright has so strongly emphasised the need for systematic
studies of the Chinese mind (WRIGHT, 1953). This is one of those-
rare instances when academic endeavour coincides with problems of
everyday reality. Serious efforts to confront such an instance
could therefore presumably contribute to both.
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I n thus maintaining, however, there is no intention
whatsoeverto belittle what has already been done by scholars
concernedwith C hinese culture . T he varioun types of intellectual
histories which have been discussed also have their counterparts
in the study of the C hinesemind . T hus , for the unit idea approach,
one couldcite S cientismin M odernC hineseT hou Z ht by K wok ( KWOK,
1 9 6 6 ) . O f the thematicapproach, there are M etzger' s E scapefrom
P redicament, and also , S ociologyand S ocialismin C ontemporarC hina
by W ong S iu L un ( WONG, 1 9 7 9 ) . F or the culturalcurrentapproach,
one could cite L evenson' s celebratedwork , C onfucianC hina and its
M odernF ate ( LEVENSON, 1 9 6 5 ) , or C how ' s equallyfamous, yet less
macroscopicT he M ay - F ourthM ovement( CHOW, 1 9 6 0 ) . F or studies
centeringon the intellectualactors , there are A n O ld C hina and
a N ew W orldby K . C . H siao( HSIAO, 1 9 7 2 ) , I n S earchof W ealthand
P owerby B enjaminS chwartz( SCHWARTZ, 1 9 5 2 ) , and also L evenson' s
L iang C hi - C hiao ( LEVENSON, 1 9 5 ) . T ogether, thesemakeup an
impressivelist , and the list is not exhaustiveeither . H owever ,
as for the multiple intellectual biography approach , fewer efforts
can be found . T he best exampleone could cite so far would be
T he C risis of C hineseC onsciousnessby L im Y u S eng , dealingwith
L u H sun , H u S hih , and C hen T u - S hiu simultaneously, usingtheir
totalistic iconoclasmas a common ground for comparison. I n
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addition to this largely missing genre , the afore - cited works
are also biased towards the study of a C hina which has gradually
ceased to be contemporary. T he only exceptionwould be the work
by W ong S iu L un , which analysesthe situationin contemporary
mainlandC hina the siti . iationoversea, in H ong K ong , T aiwan, or
elsewhere remains basically unexplored .
T hus , one can detect a genuineneed in the writing of
intellectualhistories for contemporaryC hina . T he present study
can then justify itself on this ground : that it attemptsto use
a less well - experimentedapproachto look into a less well - explored
area of the contemporaryC hinese mind . A nd if we have suggested.
in the above the weaknessesof a sociologicalmode of investigation
for a system of idea , the idea system we are here probinginto
is neverthelessto a large extent sociologicallyre evant . I t is
the nature of this substantiveconcern which may tie in the present
endeavourwith the area of sociologicalanalysis proper . I n this
introduction, the methodologicalside has been discussed at length .
A s for the substantivearea concerned, it will be the task of the
rest of this theses to probe into it .
CHAPTER ONE
NEW - CONFUCIANISMD ITS CONTEXT
T he fall of old C hina must have been a familiarstory
to anyonewho should listen . L ess familiar, though, is the
impact it had on those intellectualswho stood between these two
world orders - - between a tradition which is irretrievablyrapidly
retreating , and a novel present so steadfastlygaining dominace .
F or these intellectualsof may be different inclinations, the
repercussionswere neverthelessthe same when a set of accepted
faiths and unquestioned principles abruptly pulverized before their
very eyes , and beyond their entrenchedcomprehension. A nd with the
up - rooting of their accustomedmode of adaptation, these intellectuals,
for a period of indefiniteduration , drifted into anarchy . C onsensus
on either the origin of or the remedy for this general bankruptcy
of culture, even up to now , has not been reached. F rom the late
C hing onward, down to the M ay - fourth, the self - searchingof the
intellectualsfor a regenerationand revitalisationof the C hinese
culture has followed the most divergent paths possible , portraying
a dazzling labyrinthof ideas which is the one sure symptomof a
general cultural enigma . O ne thing is clear , that when tradition
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disintegrates each man must forge his own value. It is to discern
how a particular group of intellectuals-- the New Confucians,
have grappled with this historical/cultural dark alley, and hcwi
they strove to foster their system of morale and value that the
present study is directed.
Aside from the more obvious fact that intellectuals are
better endorsed with both information and other tools of thought,
and thereby in a more advantageous position to apprehend urgent
problems of various kinds, the intellectuals in traditional China
had the additional burden of being the acknowledged interpreters
of time and circustances, whom people naturally turned to in the
face of chaos or upheavels. Lin Yu-seng has pointed out that
the intellectual elites of China are the bearers of the cultural
intellectualistic approach, i.e. they are the unflinching advocates
who placed ideas and intellects on a priority higher than either
the materialistic, utilitarianistic, or any other facets of life.
This unbending, almost axiomatic belief was widely shared in
traditional China, culminating in the famous stratification scheme
of scholars, farmers, labourers, and merchants, with the intellectual
elites promptly occupying the top of the social heirachy. The
prophets of doom in ancient Israel have thus found their secular
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counterparts in the twilight of traditional- C hina, both bitterly
suffering through the agony of disenchantment when a well- loved
civilization disintegrates, and both feeling the intense urge
to indicate a way of escape for their fellow countrymen out of
the impending catastrophe.
T he intellectuals from late C hing onward differed in their
various interpretations of the crisis facing C hina and its possible
cures, yet in their largely unanimous stress on the higher priority
of ideas and intellect, and underlying uniformity can nevertheless
be detected. I n thus maintaining, political and economic changes
become subordinated to cultural and intellectual changes. P resumably,
from a change in the C hinese world view, there would follow changes
in the systems of symbols, values, belief, etc., which would ultimately
induce changes in the concrete political, social, and economic sectors
( LIN, 1 9 7 9). T hinkers as different as Y en F u( L), rang Y au
W ei T an S su T ung L iang C hi C hao
etc., shared the same point of departure as regard the role of ideas
in human history, stressing in unswerving earnestness the urgency
to foster a cultural foundation, based on a reformulated world view,
for socio- political changes( LIN, 1 9 7 9).
深 启 道（ 康 有 为 ）
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The history of intellectual responses in this age of
cardinal disillusionment is a devious one, covering personae
of various scholastic heritages, and extending over a whole
century. Yet it may be possible to identify roughly four main
approaches attempting to unravel the problems of Chinese
civilization. Thus, firstly, there is the so-calLed National
Essence school, represented by Yang Yau Wei and his followers,
and characterised by their effort to revive Confucianism into a
religio-ethical system through a reinterpretation and adaptation
of the Confucian classics along the footsteps of the New Text
school. Secondly, the May-fourth positivists, represented by
Hu-Shih and his fellow advocates of science and Democracy -- a
group more scientistic than scientific, notwithstanding the high
value they attached to the democratic spirit. Thirdly, there are
left-wing scholars like Lu Hsun and Chen Tu Hsiu, who shared with.
the May-fourth intellectuals their disappointment in the cultural.
heritage of traditional China, yet preferred to Seek for salvation
from the socialists rather than the liberal traditions of the
western world. Lastly, there are, the New Confucians, the dramatis
personae of this study, who endeavour to strike a golden mean
between variegated extremes of totalistic responces
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Central to each of these different stances is a concern
for the same enigma: What is the role of Chinese traditional
culture in the restoration and renewal of Chinese civilization
amidst the general crisis of a cultural failure--of-nerves?
Should it be simply discarded, or obstinately reaffirmed even
in the face of formidable challenges? Both the May-fourth
positivists and the left-wing scholars adopted the stance of a
totalistic rejection, while the National Essence school adhered
to the other polarity and reaffirmed the moral superiority of
Chinese tradition. And between these opposing poles are the New
Confucians, painstakingly steering their middle-course and puritanically
struggling against inevitable vacillations. The complex problematics
facing contemporary Chinese intellectuals is therefore really
revolving around a central paradox -- the interplay between an all-
embracing, forward looking life style designated as modern, versus
a stubbornly sustaining, if not actually out-of-date, tradition.
Lin Yu Seng, in his study on the totalistic iconoclasm among modern
Chinese intellectual, is but attempting to document how intellectuals
favouring the exorcision of traditional culture have contrived to
disentangle the confrontation between tradition on the one hand, and
modernity on the other, and how the latter has been possible through
relinquishing the-former. The subject matter of Lin 's study
therefore covers but one side of the coin, and as such mush not be
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taken as fully representativeof the entire landscape . T otalistic
conservatism, however , has justly fallen into oblivion . B lind
faith which overlooksthe practical dimension. , of human affairs
naturally degenerateso become but sets of out worn dogmas , and
K ang Y au W i and his followersare at present quite understandably
part of historicalrelics .
T he area which is still relativelyunexplored, therefore,
is that of those intellectualswho reached for some sort of balance
between what is traditionals versus what is modern , and for the
purposeof this study , they will be representedby the group of
scholars commonlydesignatedas the N ew C onfucians
T his study will focus on three personaein particular:
T ang C hun- I ( 唐 居 毅 ) , M ou T sungS an （ 年 宗 三 ） and C hienM u
the three acknowledgedexponentsof N ew C onfucianism,
co - foundersand associatesof the N ew A sia C ollegeof H ong K ong .
T hese three scholars, and the N ew C onfucianismwhich they represent,
demonstratehow the crisis of C hinese civilizationcan be concep -
tualised in such a way that the dissipationof which presupposeda
cautious balance between the past and the future . T heir position
is congruouswith other fellow intellectuals' , in their ardent
recognitionof the existential priority of the present and future
钱 穆
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as against the past . Y et they surpass these other intellectuals
in their reluctanceto resign what has been in favour of what is
and will be . I nstead , the central intent of their unrelenting
moral pilgrimageis but to harmonise, to reach for a viablerecon-
ciliation between the different existential and temporal dimensions
of human affairs . F or them , the differentpolaritiesof past ,
present , etc . could well becomeresolvableinto ' higher ' idea
systems- - i . e . to resolve paradoxesarising from the transient
realm of phenomenaby seeking repose from the more sustaining, even
eternal , realm of noumena. A nd this incarnationof ideas , which
K ant himself ascertainedas beyond human intellect , could be
realised through a revival of particular tenets interspersedamong
certain streams of C hinese philosophy, especiallyC onfucianism.
T hus , in trying to disentangleth modern / traditionalparadox,
their endeavour amounts to suggesting that possibly the former
is but a function of the latter , and that only through a regeneration
of the geist of traditional. C hinese culture could a C hinese road
to modernitybecome palpable . I f this line of reasoningproved
convincing, it may be possible to summarisemore succintly the
central theme of the present exercise : that the problematics
facing . the N ew - C onfucianswith regard to the socio - cultural
turmoils of present day C hina can be epitomisedin a resolution
between tradition and modernity , and that their final explication
conveys that modernity could only be accomplishedthrough a
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revitalisation of the traditional cultural heritage, that a step
backward into the Chinese past would provide the spirit, if not
actually the bridge, for China's progress into a modern world.
In this way, these new-Confucians of contemporary China have at
least offered a theoretical responces to a socio-political reality.
And in resolving what they regarded as the impending turmoil of
China, they emphatically stretched both their question and its
corresponding answer to such logical extremities that, at one
stroke, they almost look like an universal prescription for human.
sufferings as a whole.
Specifically, the time span to be covered in this study
is the period since 1949, i.e. the thirty years since the establish-
ment of the People's Republic of China --- the one great watershed
which epitomised in a glaring instance the decline and fall of old
China, the dethronement of universal kingship, the factionalism of
regions, the conflicts over ideas, and, ultimately, the irretrievability
of time and circumstances. In a strange moment of history, a state,
a system of government, a political episode, abruptly becomes trans-
formed into a metaphor, symbolising the yearning of some, and the
nightmare of others, juxtaposing in a perspicacious embodiment
either the messianic hopes or the anonymous fears which the people
of China have been cherishing, consciously or otherwise, throughout
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the entire last century of catastrophe and hallnceanation. The
establishment of the PRC therefore serves as a concrete Point of
reference for Chinese intellectuals of whatever leanings, a
waystation the assault on and defence for which act as starting
point for zealous contemplations of various sorts into the ideal
utopia of the Chinese future. The New Confucians inevitably
engaged themselves in this political dialogue, and, almost by
definition, they are in dissonant with the reigning doctrines of
the PRC. By first striking a discord with this political manifesta-
tion, they may move further to demonstrate the impregnability of
the Chinese cultural heritage.
Yet the PRC is relevant here also in another sense. For,
in addition to the various impacts it has on the consciousness of
the Chinese people, it is also the regime which expelled into exile
those intellectuals unwilling to canonise the prospect of a Communist
China. They therefore went overseas, most joined the national
government of Taiwan, while others went to either America or, as
in the present instances, to Hong Kong. The prolonged tarry of
these New Confucians in Hong Kong is an ineluctable one. For the
academic scene in Taiwan has all along been dominated by Hu-Ship
and his disciples, the scholarly community represented by the
Academy Sinica, from whichthe New Confucians felt themselves
ostracized. This explained the prolonged stay of the New Confucians
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in H ong K ong , where they undertookto uphold what they espoused
as the core spirit of C hinese civilisationamong the emigres
from C hina by foundinga cultural and . educationalenter prise ,
the N ew A sia C ollege, in - 1 9 5 O .
T o echo G eorg L ukacs , organisationis but the mediation
betweenideas and reality . Y et the N ew C onfucians, in their
endeavourto sustain the spirit of a C hinese culture , had to
grapple with two distinct realities - - a more distant , indirect ,
yet nonethelessbeloved C hinese reality , and a immediate, mudane ,
everydayworld of H ong K ong . G ertrudeS tein ' s dictumis thus a
fitting one , when she observedthat writers have to have two
countries, the one where they belong , and the one which they live
in really . T o wrestlewith a dual reality of both C hina and L ong
K ong , however , often involved ruptures not easily compromisable.
F or H ong K ong is a city of unrelentingpropresss, a prosperous
parvenu more at home with material returns than spiritual
liberations. T he quick tempo towards worldly grandeur thus left
these more reserved , uncompromisingintellectualsa marginal group ,
suffused with humiliationsby the half - truths and comforting
illusions people adhere to , yet remainingunable to redress the
situation . I t is this unfortunatestriture over world views and
stand points which led to such ineluctableincidents as the clash
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between New Asia College and the Chinese University of Hong Kong
0
in 1976, into which it became incorporated when the latter was
established in 1963.
This excursus into the general context of New Confucianism
and its proponents allows for a conceptualisation of the situaticn
of the New Confucians as responding to a series of paradoxes
stemming from the cultural, theoretic order, and becoming manifested
in some more concrete instances of socio-political confrontation,
These New Confucians are exiles and marginal men in a double sense:
marginal to and exile from both the dominant academic community and prevail-
ing social processes. Their strong feeling of agony is thus under-
standable.
The previous chapter has suggested that the present study
would be modelled after the works of Stern and Shattuck, thus, an
explanation of its general layout may be necessary. Specifically,
the central problematic of the present study is, as has been discussed
at length, the cultural crisis of modern China. Yet this problematic
can be variously approached. Thus, just as Shattuck, for his particular
area of investigation, identified four different themes and then pinned
them down on to loin representative personae, the present study
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identifies three approaches to the cultural crisis of China,
and pins them down on to three specific drwatis pepsonae
These three approaches might be described as three motifs, for
they represent three sources of inspiration from which our
dramatis personae derive their respective solutions to the crisis
of the Chinese consciousness.
These three approaches or motifs are, respectively,
culture, philosophy, and history, corresponding to the three
figures of Tang Chun-I, Mou Tsung-San, and Chien Mu. Discussion
and investigation of the respective thought systems of each of
these figures thus have a meaning not confined to these scholars
as isolated figures. Instead, they also play a more foundamental
role of illuminating how the problem of China could be approached
through different intellectual trajectories. In this sense then,
the selection of these figures is not accidental. When together,
they illuminate not only the theoretical stance of the new Con-
fucians, but also the different fronts against which intellectuals
direct their confrontation with China's cultural. crisis.
CHAPTER TWO
TANG CHUN-I （唐居毅）
It is Tang Chun-I() who Supplies the present
study with its first substantive motif-culture. By pondering upon
the nature, limits, and strength of Chinese culture, Tang has been
able to penetrate into P. greater depth concern -ing the cause of
China's present cultural crisis. For him, both the triumph and
the tragedy of Chinese culture can become accountable only when
we grasp the geist of Chin ,,se culture, which holds all the promises
and solutions to the present enigma facing Chinese culture.
Tang was born in 1909, in the province of Szechwan. He
thus belonged very much to those scholars who stood mid-way between
the old China and a new world. Before .1Q49, he has taught in various
academic institutions in Chdna, and he flee to Hong Kong after the
conquest of PRC. In 1950, together with Chien Mu and other emigre
scholars, he became the co-founder of the New Asia. College of Hong
Kong, which becomes the basis upon which Tang expresses his various
ideals of culture and education, until his death in 1978.
The voluminous writings of Tang Chun-I's work make up -an
.mpressive, if at times also confusing,maze of words which is not
ub ject to easy exegesis. To come to an understanding of his
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thoughts and opinions, therefore, some kind of classification
scheme must be first constructed so as to bring out the themes
underlying his entire output.
In his new introudction to the 10th edition of The S it
and Value of Chinese Culture (TANG, 1978). Tang Churn--I himself
provides a typology for his writings. He broadly distinguishes
them into four types: 1. general discourse on different facets
of the human world, such as culture, life, morality, reason, etc.
2. philosophical works, in the forms of either system-building
or critical evaluation of other philosophies 3. works dealing
with the reconstruction of culture and humanism 4. special
studies on Chinese philosophy. This classification scheme has
the great merit of indicating the different areas covered by
Tang's work as conceived by himself. What this scheme fails to
point out, however, is the interrelationship between these different
aspects of Tang's thought. Surely the development of Tang Chun--I
as a thinker does not take the form of four parallel lines, and it
will be safe to assume that the different areas covered by his
thought stand in a specific relation to each other, while interlocking
with Tang's certain subterranean central concerns.
To highlight the focus and coherence of Tang Chun-Its
thought, therefore,' it may be possible to conceive of his intellectual
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developmentas the locus of two overlappingcircles . The center
of the first circle is his The Spirit and Value of Chinese Culture
( TANG , 1952 , 1978 ) , and centerof the second, his magnumopus
Existenceand the Realms of Consciousness( TANG , 1977 ) . These
two works cover the same set of problems. But while the former
looks at these problems specificallyin the context of Chinese
culture , the latter attemptsto examine them in the context of
humanity per se . They therefore represent some kind of boundary
of Tang ' s thought, ' and the entire outputof Tang ' s work Couldbe
taken as a continuousdevelopmentfrom the former to the latter ,
in that they serve as either footnotesto the former , or prelude
to the latter . Even his writings which seeminglybear only very
remote connectionswith these two works , like his academicphilo -
sophical writings , on closer inspectioncan often be found to
illuminatecertain obscure corners embodiesin them . In fact , to
characterizeTang Chun - I ' s work in this way is but to echo Mou
Tsung - San ' s remark, that Tang is a giant in the universeof culture
consciousness. It is thus possible to consider the whole spectrum
of Tang ' s life and work as focused singularlyon problemsstemming
from the cultural universe . Ultimately , his thought revolves
around two centres : Chinese culture in particular, and the human
cultural universe in general .
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Though a professional. philosopher by training, therefore,
Tang has given up the task of pure academic ph loophic work and
assumed the prophetic role of a cultural He is involved
with the problem of culture and its salvation, often with the
missionary fervour of a religious sect. And in his consistency
in advocating a moral pilgrimmage, he builds up for himself an
unique intellectual temperament whichhelps in giving his voice
a charismatic distinctiveness. He is not a cool and detached
philosopher, like Mou Tsung-San. Nor is he an archaeologist of
historical. details, Like Chien-Mui. His forerunner is rather Kang
Yu-Wei, both aspiring to reconstruct Confucianism into a secular,
moral, if not broadly political religion for the Chinese people.
This instance of an academic turned prophet should not
surprise us, for there has always existed a subti:l e interplny
between knowledge, philosophy, on the one hand, and faith and
religion on the other. While both philosophy and religion attempt
to confront problems of chance and necessity, philosophy falls
short in providing easy and palpable answers. In times of rapid
social changes or extreme crisis, therefore, knowledge often gives
way to faith, and philosophy becomes suffused with religious spirit.
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It is in this context that the views of Tang can be hest understood.
The kinds of questions which he intends to solvtie cannot be answered
in single philosophical terms. Tang thus offshoots the threshold
of philosophy, and assumes the role of a prophet for a supreme
religion based on Confucianism. In this relivion. the human actors
become established as the ultimate judge of human affairs in this
secular world, which is also the only world there is In turning
knowledge into faith, Tang's route of development is shared by
intellectuals of other times and places. Like Paul Legarde in
Imperial Prussia, or Bakunin in the twilight of Tsarist Russia,
they all cherish the same earnestness in asserting the undeniable
truth and moral superiority of a body of doctrines which could serve
as the mainspring for a re vi talization and re ,tructur•ing of a
declining nation or civilization.
The thought of Tang Chun-I is therefore hest understandable
if it is cast in a religious mataphor, follow .np the dual. processes
of Revelation and Redemption. Thus, in religious constructs,
revelation refers to the processes whereby the human actors become
conscious of the limits imposed on themselves by both the external
environment and their internal' impulse. This consciousness therefore
leads to a realization of the existence of a higher idealof being,
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attainable but not yet possessed by the individual. To strive for
the redemption of this ideal, the individual attempts to overcome
his limits by redeeming and maintaining his goodness, and abandoning
his sin. If he is successful he will be resurrected from the realm
of man into the realm of eternity and complete the cycle of salvation.
Thus, the individual actor, starting from the consciousness of
particular problems, become finally admitted into a realm where
problems are solved once and for all. An analogous construct may
be identified underlying the content of Tang Chun-I's thought, if
his focus is more on the resurrection of a culture than its composing
individuals. In Tang, however, this is the only way whereby individuals
may also gain their salvation. In Tang's thought, then, the point
of departure is taken from specific problems stemming from a decaying
culture. Yet by seeking a way to transcend the predicaments facing
this culture, Tang has found it necessary to come to terms with
problems in the cultural universe as a whole. And the path of
salvation he establishes, in order to transcend the limit of
knowledge and experience, has led him to become more intuitive, at
times even mystical, than rational. Ultimately, both the problems
and their solutions are raised to a deeper level of consciousness,
where they supposedly conquer the transience of the phenomenal
world and become closer to truth and eternity.
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Thus, in interpreting Tang Churn -I's t hought, we could
basically follow these two dimensions of revelation and redemption,
and see how Tang has striven to reach a largely religious goal
without actually invoking any images of sacredness.
In 1952, the year when Tang Chun--I wrote his-The Spirit
and Value of Chinese Culture, the situation which he found himself
facing was one of a general cultural disorientation, resulting
from the series of historicaltragedies China had suffered for the
last hundred years, which had brought about a radical change in
the individual's perception of his environment. Thus, to use Sorokin's
words, when a population finds itself uprooted, ruined, multilated
and annihilated by the crisis, even the ordinary man in the street
cannot help asking: How has all these come about? What does it call
mean? Who is responsible for it? What are its causes? ......4'
(SOROKIN, 1952: P.1-- 9). At the root of this disorientation loomed
the menacing shadow of the iconoclasm of the newly established PRC.
It is to conquer the dark side of life that every religion directs its
effort, and the same holds true for Tang's secular religion. The
process of a social revelation thus consists mainly of the ways man
becomes conscious of the cultural confusions and finds it undesirable.
Tang does not confront these general cultural problems in
abstract terms. Instead, his strength lies in his ability to
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clarify and pin down the specific foucs and nature of this general
crisis facing the individuals and their cul Lure. His point of
departure is, naturally, the repercussions of the w,,-!stern impacts
on Chinese culture from the ]late Ching onward. ']'an describes
the history of this period as a history of the gradual. conquest
of Chinese traditional culture by western culture (TANG, 1978:
P. 473). This recognition has led to a series of problems: is
it true that the spirit of Chinese culture has with-.n it a sustaining
value? If not, then how could the culture and history of China
have been maintained for over five thousand years? Secondly, what
are the defects of Chinese culture? Why must. social reforms of
the last hundred years unanimously take after western culture and
thought? and why is China relegated to such a miserable position
in international relations? etc. (TANG, 1978: P. 473)*
If Chinese culture is facing this complex set of disturbing
questions, the individual who dwells therein can fare no better. Its
some of his writings aiming particularly at the youthful audience,
Tang discusses in great detail the obstructions and difficulties
facing individuals who strive far-self-actualization and autonomy
in a socio-cultural milieu of general distortion and break-down.
As a corollary of a wayward cultural development, the road to self-
fulfillment has often become, a maze. Tang remarks thus: a man's
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aspiration to raise his level of existence, to strive towards a
realm of ideal life, his upward journey and his motives behind,
all these are closely bound up with and inseparable from the way
of downward decadence (TANG, 1961: P. 4). The road to sagehood
is thus connected with the road of vice and evil, and the individuals
no matter how well-intended his purpose, is constantly facing the
danger of unwittingly crossing from one to the other. This is so
because, in a time of disorientation, the bearing of life has also
changed. The distinction between coordinates of high and low, good
and evil, meaningful and meaningless etc., have all become confused.
If there used to be a way to truth, that way is no longer reliable
as a consequence of the changing definition and expression of man °s
perfectibility as against his fallibility.
At this juncture, we can see that Tang's concern is both
with the cultural crisis facing China and also with the individual
actors who dwell therein. Up to this point, the problems are
defined in the specific context of the Chinese cultural crisis.
Yet the theme of crisis and destruction has a bearing which transcends
the specific context of China. If the crisis of Chinese culture
is a specific one, it can also be taken as one particular manifestation
of the universal theme of destruction. Thus, in discussing the nature
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of distortions and destructions, Tang has inevitably found it
necessary to come to terms with more fundamental problems,
including problems such as death, which .is the most universal
form of destruction, and, as Such is a problem of general bearing.
Tang's position here i.: reminiscent of the Exi stentit. list s such
as Martin Heidegger. For, if there is no waY to give a more
permanent meaning to the limited span of physical life, it will
also be futile to give any meaning to the nia? ntai nence of a cultural
order. Dostoevesky has grimly remarked, if immortality is
impossible, then everything becomes possible. But nothing
meaningful. In a time of general socio-cultural confusions, then,
men are either morally or physically destroyed. To completely
conquer this dark side of life, an exit must be indicated which
could overcome the totality of these distortions and destructions,
overcome even death itself. This requires, among other things,
that the human actors firstly muster up all their moral courage
and ego strength. And for this to be possible, men must have faith
in the intrinsic value of existence itself, that a mails value
somehow outlives his physical life, and lives on after his death.
Thus, in his effort to reveal the dark alley facing Chinese
and their culture, Tang pushes the cause of man's predicament all
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the way backward, and ultimately attempt to disentangle the problem
of death and its possible repercussions for the living. It is at
this point that the problems of Chinese and their culture ceases
to be context specific. Instead, they are but waystations to a
more fundamental crisis shared by mankind as a whole,
For Tang, this problem of death and destruction has gained
especial urgency in the present era. For the first time in the
history of man, mankind has acquired the power to a total self-
extermination. Again and again, Tang has stressed the symptomatic
significance of nuclear weaponry and nuclear war for the life of
mankind. When in one stroke, man is able to sweep into nothingness
the entire human species and every other living creature, the
existence of man becomes even more delicate than ever before. In
a very real sense, life and death have become inseparable, not only
in the case of individuals, but for the human world as a whole. The
invention of nuclear weaponry over and above the existence of man
thus provides a perspicacious demonstration of the tenuousness of
human beings, and it becomes even more urgent to bridge the two
worlds of life and death, light and darkness
The crisis of Chinese culture is therefore not of Chinese
alone, but is inseparable from a more basic and general crisis
51
facing civilization per se. In this way, c'Larting from the crisis
of Chinese culture and consciousness, Tangy ends up with an anatomy
of world-wide catastrophe. And this he has done in his last major
work, Existence and the Realms of Consciousness (TANG, 1977). To
recapitulate, we can see that the formation of Tang's problematic
is composed mainly of four themes, unfolding from one to the other.
Thus, his first point of departure is the cultural problem of China,
which leads on to a second theme: the problem of individual con-
sciousness. From this problem of consciousness sterns the question
of the limits of both moral and physical existence. And finally,
these problems are placed in the general context of the human con-
dition as a whole, thus transcending the original, restricted point
of departure. This, in a nutshell is Tang's revelation of riffs, central
problematic.
Once the problematic becomes defined, it is possible to
strive for its redemption. The basic problem here, however, is,
can anything really be done? Amidst the overwhelming tidings of
crisis and catastrophe, most people have already developed a kind
of passive pessimism, denying the autonomy of man and submitting
instead to the manipulation of certain inescapable fate. To strive
towards the redemption of the present enigma, therefore, one must
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first come to believe that it could possibly be,redressed. Man
is not bound passively to an omnipotent destiny where he is
predominated by the unknown forces of life. Through the vol.untaristic
act of man, it is po si ale for him to improve hi s lot. In other
words, in the act of cultural redemption, what is of foremost
importanceis to revivewith-inthe humanactorstheir self--confidencsothat theywill bewilling to dowhateveris possiblewithinhuman
capacity. When putting these ideas back into the context of present
day China, Tang maintains that this revival. of self-confidence could
be achieved only if the individual actors, as Chinese, come to
realize the immense potentialities which they have inherited from
their socialization with Chinese culture. The spirit of Chinese
culture can help the individual actor to redeem both himself and
his culture from the present enigma, for it upholds the optimistic
and realistic belief. in the autonomy of man. Though it honestly
admitsonthe onehandthe limitationof manandthe unpredictabilit of chance,onthe otherhandit is still ableto maintainthe self-
determining and self-responsibility ibility of man.
This line of reasoning is not put down as mere assertions
Insteaa, Tang goes into great detail in examining the context and
message of Chinese culture, and support his reaening with a immense
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body of argument. This, in fact, is the task lie carries out in
his 1952 work, The Spirit and Value of Chinese Culture (TANG, 1952)
It will be quite impossible to give a detailed review of this
work here, yet it may be suffice to give an example of how Tang
argues his case.
Tang's argument is most succintly summarised in a small
section of his 1952 work, a section dealing with the tragic spirit
in Chinese literature (TANG, 1952). This discussion of tragedy
and the tragic spirit is highly enlightening in the present regard
because tragedy is in fact more than a mere genre of art. If
embodies the human effort to make sense of the confrontation between
man and an unknown destiny, whether expressed in the form. of super
natural deities, social forces, or mere cross purposes, etc. It
demonstrates how a people settle accounts with the genuine yet non-
logical forces which in the final analysis determines the form and
direction of life. In this sense, it may be understandable why
western tragedy has been regarded as the highest or noblest form
of.literary genre.
In the development of Chinese literature, however, tragedy
has been conspicuously absent. Artists and literary writers in
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traditional China seemed not to have realized the tragic and
ineluctable side of life. Instead, they have been careful to
give each man his due, so that in the end of a drama or novel,
as a rule, evil would be punished and virtue rewarded. Unlike
western tragedies which often ended in death and irredeemable
damage. chinese literature often ended in death and irredeemable
in the final analysis. Does this lack of tragedy symbolise also
a lack of the tragic sense of life? And is it possible to project,
from this lack, that the would view nurtured by chinese culture
is more naive, one-sided and superficial one than the western one?
This is basically the question Tang addresses himself towards. And
in trying to give an adequate answer, he necessarily touches on what
he regards as the true fface of chinese culture and world-view.
The merits of western tragedy, as Tang has noted,lies in
its demonstration of the absoluteness of virture, its caharsis
of man's will and extents his life horizon. In western tragedy,
the dramatic act often ends in death, for it is only in death that
a man's spirit and will become separated from his bodyy, and its
value freed from the contamination of bodily sin. TO conquer
destruction, the only way of the western tragic hero is to have
himself destroyed. However, in contra-distinction to a western
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tragic spirit which portrays the liberation of individual tthrough
destruction, Tang maintains that there is also a distinct tragic
spirit embeds in Chinese culture, a spirit which he describes as
“tragic and yet trans-tragic. And for Tang, there are two distinct
characteristics of this Chinese tragic spirit: that the dramatic
act must have its fulfillment in the real world of everyday affairs,
and that this tragic consciousness does not focus on individual
actors as such, but covers mankind as a whole.
If western tragedy has focused on the overdetermination
of the individuals by his fate or a supernatural reality, in China
the emphasis is rather on the other extreme. Thus, the focus is
placed on the totality of men, and they are but forsaken, not
overdetermined. Over-redetermination implies that there are rules
or forces, whether secular of sacred, governing the affairs of men,
even if they know nothing about it. Forsakeness, however, means
that there are nothing of the sort, and men cannot resort to any
standard of judgement higher than their own. Unlike in western
tragedy, in Chinese culture tidings of fortune are not regarded as
fights between the subjective ideal of mall and the objective pressure
of circumstances. They are instead simply recognised as part of the
transience of human affairs, and, since Chinese culture does not
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pose any image of eternity, the predomination of tanscience is
taken as normal. Thus, for Tang, in China, not tragedy, but
nothingness, reigns. Western tragedy can resort to the inter-
vention of god and supernatural reality, and the hero still lives
on evenwhen he is destroyed. Yet in Chinese culture, every realm
of life must ultimately converge with the real world of human
affairs. Social reality is the only stage where tragedy begins
and ends, beyond this stage, there is not other, and thus, the
Chinese tragic spirit forbids fulfillments to be satisfied in some
non-existing realms. The everyday world is the only world existing.
In Tang, to admit that the boundary of the social world is also the
ultimate boundary of mankind, this is a even more tragic recognition.
There is no realms of god, of spirit, or of absolute turth, and
every loss must be repaid in this world, or it, is lost forever.
Thus, one development of this tragic consciousness is that no
tragedy of the western type can be found in Chinese literature.
Every drama, novel, etc. no matter how depressing in its plot,
always ends on a note of happiness, what is lost will be recovered,
the good be rewarded, evil punished etc. Even when occasionally
a work does end with unfulfillment, subsequent writers were prone
to revise it, or to write sequels to render the tragic back into
justice and happiness. But this is by no means a lack. of tragic
spirit. It is rather a even more tragic recognition of the
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impossibilities of having fulfillment in some other worlds. Since
there are no worlds other than our own, everything must be paid and
repaid here and now. Chinese literature thus expresses the intense
desire that happiness must simultaneously accompany virtue in the
everyday world.
Derived from this particular tragic consciousness is its
collective nature, involving not individuals but mankind per se.
It depicts not the tragedy of an individual and his environment,
but the tragedy of a human world and its place in a transcient,
ever-changing universe. The tragic hero is the totality of the
human actors per se, and the predicament comes from the uncertainty
and unpredictability of the cosmos upon which the human world exists.
This confrontation between the human world and the universe is the
ultimate tragedy, a summation of all the tragic acts possible in the
human world. In encountering this ultimate tragedy,, individuals no
longer simply feel sad or melancholy as such, the feeling is instead
a desolation that stems from an immense sense of emptiness. In
recognising the loneliness and forsakeness not of the individuals,
but of the human world. as a whole, the individual cannot settle
with a personal feeling of sadness. Instead, the tragic consciousness
becomes diffused into every facet of the everyday world. Every aspect
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of life is therefore mingled with a subterranean sense of tragic
consciousness, and within the omnipresence of tragic spirit, the
individuals smile and talk and carry on with their social interaction.
The sense of tragedy is internalized to become a part of everyday
life and therefore falls outside deliberate consciousness. It is
in this sense that Tang maintains that in the Chinese sense of
tragedy, where tragedy is pressed to its utmost, both happiness and
sadness loose their grips on men, and social life carries on so
•though nothing had happened.
In examining traditional Chinese literature, Tang regards
novels like The Water Margin or Story of the Stone as embodying most
strikingly the Chinese sense of tragedy. The Water Margin depicts the
obsolate glamor of heroic endeavours within a solitary cosmos, and
The Story of the Stone suggests that the glory of the human world
comes from an immense emptiness, to which it will inevitably return.
Yet against such desolate backgrounds, the actors and characters carry
on with their multifarious social dramas, paying no attention to
whatever may lurk either in their past or their future. Together, these
two novels embody what Tang has characterised as the tragedy of a
human world in a transciert, solitary universe.
It is by following this line of reasoning that Tang could
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maintain that the tragic consciousness in Chinese culture is more
penetrating and intense than in the case of western tragedy. Yet
in confronting and disentangling man's relation to the unknown
force of life and nature, the tragic spirit of Chinese culture
has been able to transform this immense sense of sorrow into a
positive force, a force which could serve as the motive for mankind
to overcome their predicament, be it imposed by nature or by the
socio-cultural environment. Thus, from tragic consciousness is
generated a genuine humanism in the culture of China.
For Tang, ultimately the lesson of either The Water Nargir.
of The Story of the Stone is to indicate a way through which a man
can become liberated from the meaninglessness of life and forge his
own value amidst the delicate being of the social world. If, as in
the conception of Western tragedy, man is overdetermined by forces
external and objective to himself, there is then no v a margin left
whereby the individual may find a way to liberate himself. In the
case of the Chinese tragic spirit, however, the human world exists
by itself, and there can be no other forces standing external to and
predominating over men. The human actors are therefore left free to
forge their own value and outlet. Thus the individual actor does not
fight as a solitary figure, as in'the case of western tragedy. Instead,
it is through staying with one another that meaning may be forged for
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the human world. The only way to tragic fulfillment is therefore
a collective one, like the one hundred and eight heros in The Water
Margin, or the extended clan of the Chia family in The }tort' of the
Stone. The sense of tragic consciousness therefore serves as a tie
to bind the human actors into an entity. This is not possible in
the west, where precisely the others are often responsible for the
tragic events experienced by the hero. It is in this sense that,
in contradistinction to the western tragic consciousness, its Chinese
counterpart can become the mainspring of an authentic humanism. it
is from this humanism that ultimately redemption of the human world
can be possible. Thus, not only does Tang argue that Chinese culture
possesses a deeper understanding of the tragic elements in human
life, but he also suggests that the value of Chinese culture lies in
its ability to transcend this tragic element to become a positive force
in life, while in western in western tragedy, all that the tragic
spirit can portray is a deadly drama with no exit.
This road to the transcendence of tragedy takes its point of
departure from the recognition of the transcience of the human world,
a recognition which stems from the estrangement of the world of
objective happenings from human discretion, that facts and incidents
seem to possess a logic of their own, regardless of the human will.
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To have recognised this sense of tragic uncertainty is highly depressing.
Yet to that extent, it also increases our understanding and concern
with this fleeting world of human affairs. The feeling of sadness
and despair etc. are genuine feelings which render the world all
the more realistic for the human actor concerned. He became tied
to the world through his sadness and despair, and consequently
ascertains the reality of the human world, even in front of its
ever-changing facade. Thus, from perceiving life and world as
unreal and illusory, there emerges a corresponding feeling that it
is nonetheless a reality against which emotions and thoughts can be
directed. The tragic element in Chinese culture thus, stands in a
dialectical relationship with the resulting humanism. From an
absolute solitariness and despair, one can validate the existence of
a human reality, and therefore generate a even higher feeling of love
and concern for the human world.
In this way, tragedy and humanism blend together, within the
frame of a Confucian secularism. Infused in the spirit of Chinese
culture is just such an immense, all-pervading humanism, produced from
a more fundamental sense of tragedy. One can therefore understand
why, at the root of Chinese culture, there lies a positive and optimistic
attitude towards life, which can enable the culture to be revitalised
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even in its darkest nightmare. Problems of destrl.ection and distortion
therefore do not necessarily render the human actors helpless.
Despair and pessimism can serve as motives towards a higher, more
profound, and more active humanism, even when we admit the solitariness
of the human world and the transcience of a purposeless cosmos. This
tragic spirit of Chinese culture is thus the mainspring from which
strength and the courage of cultural reconstruction could be derived.
By highlighting the collective nature of men's confrontation
with the environment, by stressing the secularism. of being, and by
maintaining the significance of men's self-determination and self-
responsibility, Tang has succeeded in solving a largely ontolgoical
question within a Confucianism framework. Careful observer can surely
discover that Tang's line of argument is basically Confucianist in
nature.Andthe spirit of Chineseculture, includingthe tragic 11 spirit, is butoneversionor anotherof the Confucianwayof life.
It is from his particular Confucian interpretation .of life and culture
that Tang has formulated his conviction of the potentiality of a
tragic humanism.
In this way, Tang thus developed his faith and his solution
to the crisis facing Chinese culture in particular and humanity in
general. And this solution can.be sought by resorting simply to the
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secular world of the human actors. From this position, tang launches
his scheme for the redemption and transcendence of.men and their culture.
For Tang, this involves basically a renewed understanding of
both the nature of man and the society he lives in. if the human
condition can be authentically unravelled, if the meaning and implications
of different facets of existence can be grasped, the human actor will
be then able to reach for a more meaningful way of living and rescued
from the antinomies of a world of relativized truths through the
establishment of possible absolute values.
To achieve a renewed understanding of the human conditions
so as to discover the meaning of and the road to an authentic life,
this is the last task which Tang addresses himself towards, and which
culminates in his maguum opus, Existence and the Realm of Consciousness
(TANG, 1977). In this massive work, Tang the ontological architect
strives to discern the fundamental structure of the human universe--
the subterranean structure of the total existential context against
which. the consciousness and meaning of each individual ac for could be
possible.
The layout of thei structure consists of a broad division of
the totality of human conditions into three constitutent dimensions,
香 港 中 文 大 學 圖 書 館 藏 書
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and each of these dimensions is subdivided into three realms, thus
making a total of three dimensions and nine realms. These are laid
out in a somewhat progressive order, making the entire scheme an
evolutionary one, covering the entire spectrum of different levels of
existence.
The three basic segments are, respectively, the objective world,
the subjective. world, and the transcendental world. Very broadly,
they represent the total possibility of the directions of human con-
sciousness as against its environment. Any experiences perceived by
the individual actors will necessarily belong to one of these three
worlds.
Taking the objective world first, Tang further subdivides it
into three realms: the realm of facts( the realm
of types(and the realm of relations (功能还序境）
These three realms denote the basic components of the objective world,
and how these components stand in relation to each other. The three
controlling concepts-- facts, types, and relations, in a nutshell
express the content of the objective world. Thus, when the consciousness
of the individual reaches outward, its first encounter is with concrete,
objective facts. Contact and understanding of these facts enable the
consciousness to group them into types and then establish the relationship
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between different facts and types. The objective world is, therefore,
basically a world of facts, but through the functioning of human
consciousness it is rendered into a world of types and relationships.
The outreach of the mind and consciousness is thus, for Tang,
the key to a discovery and structuring of the objective world. This
is Tang's basic idealist position. Necessarily, then, the structuring
of the objective world have its repercussions back into the
subjective consciousness, changing the mind and its inner mechanism.
The second segment of Tang's world picture is fittingly the subjective
world, which is further subdivided into the realm of perception ( 感 觉
互 攝 境 ) the realm of meaning ( 觀 照 凌 虚 境 ） ，
and the realm of
practice ( 道 德 实 践 ) These three realms cover the spectrum
ofhe realm subjectivity of man, and its relation with the objective world.
In the realm of diosyncratic experienoeen epitomize
into pergonalities idiosyneratic to each other. Through this subjective
personality. cognition of the objective woruld would oe interpreted.
From interpretation, the realm of perception gives rise to the realm
of meaning. with the intervention of meaning, the relative impotance
of objective facts to subjective consciousness becomcs differentiated.
and individuals have to assign specific meanings to objecto or ex-
periences which they happen to encounter. However, notwithstanding
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and persons i i.d:iosyner acies, individualsthe differentia t.ion of meaning
have to go beyond the strait jacket of their own subjectivity and
enter into a group life of shared meanings. In the realm of practice
then, a compromise is made between individual differences, and this
compromise is objectivated into rules, morale, etc. to render social
practices possible.- And here, a reconciliation has been reached both
between the objective, and the subjective world, and also between the
subjectivity of the individual and the intersubjectivity of social life.
Up to this point, this description of the human condition has
emphasised the Secular side of life, and as such it seems to contain
not much novelty. Yet for Tang the human world does not end here.
Standing behind the subjective and the objective world, Tang posed a
world of transcendental, experiences. Because of its transcendental
nature, this world can enable the individuals to solve problems in a
way not possible in the secular world. And in comparing different
paths to the transcendental world, Tang's novelty lies in his maintaining
that Confucianism is superior to every other path, such as Christianity
and Buddhism.
The transcendental world, as a systemic entity, is represented
by religious sentiments of various leanings. It is Tang Chen-I's firm
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convictionthat the meaning of existenceis not a temporaryone ,
but that a more permanentmeaningis to be sought behind the multi -
farious facade of human affairs . This is the motive behind Tang ' s
analysis of the transcendentalwor d , over and above the objective
and the subjectiveworlds . This transcendentalworld is in turn
divided into three realms : The realm of divinity
as representedby Christianity the realm of nothingness
as representedby Buddism and the realm of supreme virtue
as representedby Confucianism. For Tang these are the three paths
along which the human actors could transcend the transienceof the
everyday world and gain access to certain ultimate meanings of existence .
Yet not everyoneof these paths has equal merits . In Christianity,
the kingdomof God is super - imposedupon the human world but bears no
direct affinity with it , while in Buddhism, the human world is rejected
in favour of a grim acceptanceof the nothingnessbeyond . Both play
down the importanceof the human world while pointing to an ultimate
reality , a reality which cannot be realised by taking the path of
mundane, everydaylife . Thus , the individualwho seck Lifter trans -
cendencemust choose to reject the . human world in favour of eternity .
In this sense , then , both Christianityand Buddhismfail to incorporate
the world of everydaylife into their schemeof sa . lvati on . Confucianism,
on the other hand , does not require the human actors to de - emphasise
the significanceof secular life . In fact , secular life is the totality
（ 歸 向 一 神 境 ）
( 我 法 二 空 境 )
（ 天 德 流 行 境 ）
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of experiences man is capable of, and in Confucianism, moral practices 
in the secular world are the only way towards a transcerxdental reality, 
which is also moral in essence.
Thus, of the chree roads which could transcend the limits of 
the everyday world, Confucianism affords the highest autonomy for the 
human actor. It can therefore be characterized as a human road to 
transcendence. Confucianism thus gives the clearest expression of 
the highest value possible for human beings, and, in this sense, 
makes it a belief sysoera superior to either Christianity or Buddhism.
Ultimately, tnerefore, Confucianism provides answers not only
to the problem of Chinese culture, but also for humanity as a wnole.
This has become especially timely, considering the fact that to-day 
human beings are in possession of the means of self-extermination.
We thus need to overcome the threat of destructione And one solution 
is to penetrate into a realm of human value which no weaponry could 
destroy. If at present China is suffering from cultural deterioration 
and political humiliacion, she could nevertheless revitalise herself 
and, is so doing, help to revitalize our decadent world as a whole.
This is a faith which Tang cherishes, and which, even though it may
not be correct in all its particulars. can still prove to be encouraging 
in our confrontation with the ups and downs of history.
CHAPTER THREE
Mou Tsung-San ( 牟 宗 三 ）
unlike Tang Chung-I, who tends to be at his best in passionate
construction of abstract scaffolding of ideas, Mou Tsung-san is
characterized by his cool, detached, analytic mind on the one hand.
and his being closer to the empirical world on the other. The thought
of Mou Tsung-san, therefore, constitutes a system of logically-
unfolding arguments, with a persistent theme leading through different
phases of his intellectual development.
Thus, although both Tang chun-I and Mou Tsung-san took their
point of departure from the confrontation between an old china and
new world, their respective apprcaches to this problem nevertheless
differ. Tang approaches this problem through general, all-embracing
cultural terms, discussing the nature and spirit of chinese culture.
Mou, on the other hand, tackles the question by way of politics and
philosophical discourse. He thus supplies the more analytic, dowr
to earth dimension in unravelling the present predicamont facing
chinese civilization
These differences in emphasis and problem specification,
howver, underlined by the same strong urge to solve the enigma of
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Chinese civilizationand ultimatelyof humanity as a whole . Thus ,
like Tang Chun - I , Mou also could be seen to push his own ideas to
their logical extremes , and propose general so cations for both the
cultural and the political realms alike . in this respect , he is
even more explicit than Tang . For while the latter suggestsa road
to salvationby way of a redemptionf the human condition, the
heirachyof realms he sets up do not necessarilylead from one to
the other , and if the realm of virture is indeed the highest existential
state one can aspire to , Tang does not clearly point out how it is
intellectuallysound , still less how it is practicallypossible . Nou ,
on the other hand , as a more analyticallyminded philosopher, argues
his own solution more succinetly. If he still falls short in demonstrating
how it is practicallypossible, at least he has shown it to be
intellectuallysound .
In the thoughtof Mou , therefore, the quest of progressfor a
modern China has shifted from the realms of on abstract culture into
the more specific realm of polity . And Mou approacheshi . problem
mainly by way of philosophicaldiscourse. From a re . - strt ' cturati on of
philosophicalthought , a restructurationof political system may be
achieved. Here , we can again witness the high priority assignedto
ideas in effecting , social change . This relationshipbetween philosophical
thought and political practice which Mou consistentlystresses is in
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fact the same central paired - concept which stood at the heart of
Sung neo - Confucianism: the inner realm of sagehoodversus the
outer realm of polity . Philosophicalthought , with its ontological
emphasis in traditionalChina , could actualize the inner realm of
sagehoodwhich is basicallya realm of morale and virtue . Politics ,
on the other hand , could actualizethe outer realm of polity , which
is the realm of power and its administration. Together , they composed
the ideal - typical man of neo - Confucianism, who could reach a harmony
between inner consciousnessand outer experience . Consequently, the
entire spectrum of human experience could become embraced by moral
principles. Ideally , therefore, a man should be inwardly virtuous ,
yet also able to express this virtue in outward practical affairs . If
Tang Chun - I has placed his attentionon the cultivationof inner virtue ,
Mou Teung - San takes his point of departureon how this inner virtue
can become outwardly manifested. The source for a stable and harmonious
way of living , accordingto Mou , is ultimatelyderivablefrom a
resolutionbetween the inner and outer realms of man , and he purports
to demonstratehow this resolution could be both intellectuallyand
practically possible .
Togetherwith Tang Chun - I , Mou is also a discipleof Hsiung
Shi- Li ,
attempts to synthesizebetween , different streams oif Chinese thought ,
( 熊 十 力 ) the fervent modern Chinese philosopher who
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especially Confucianism and Buddhism. Yet while HHtiung remains a
conscientious builder of metaphysical. systems, both Tang, and
especially Mou, attempt to ground such an enterprise in the distressing
reality of modern China. Biographically, the one incident which
demarcates Mou's life into two distinct phases is, again, the comes,
of Communist China. After the rise of Communist China, Mou, at the
age of forty-one, went first to Taiwan, then later to Hong Kong. The
year 1949 thus roughly divides Mo's intellectual trajectory into two
phases. Before the year 1949, his main intellectual focus was on
mathematical and symbolic logic, and he was especially attracted by
the system developed by Russell and Whitehead in their Principia
Mathematica. His intellectical interest before 1949 was therefore
more strictly academic-oriented, aiming to refine and improve the
various systems of logical reasoning as developed by the Logical-
Positivists. Ultimately, his intention was to develop a system of
transcendental logic, which could build a bridge between formal
logical constructs and metaphysical systems. After he moved to Taiwan
and Hong Kong, however, academic impartiality gave way to socio-cultura:
estrangement. In his subsequent writings therefore, a strong socio-
political concern can be easily detected, which eventually overwhelmed
his more strictly philosophical discourse, and turned it to become
more instruments of the former.
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The focus of Mou Tsung-San's thought is therefore closely
bound up with a concern for the different crisis facing China.
Compared with Tang Chun-I, they differ not so much in their initial
problem as in their specification and definition, and ultimately in
the forms of their solutions to this initial problem. The thought
of Mou Tsung-San, if less glamorous, less suffused with religious
fervour and not as multifarious, as Tang's, is nevertheless more
crystal-clear, devoid of the latter' s labyrinthine complexity. An
interpretation of his thought can thus be carried out more straight-
forwardly, foiling a rought chronological order, leading on from
his initial problems to a relentless search for answers.
It has been noted in the above the repercussion the PPC had
on the intellectual development of Mou. In terms of actual time span,
this was roughly the years around 1949, the time when victory- against
the Japanese in the second world war soon gave way to open strife
between the Communists and the 'Nationalists. This wa: the time when
Mou1 s intellectual attention gradually turned from problems of logic
and analytic philosophy to the socio-political catastrophe of the
real world. The shift started even when Mou was still teaching in
the mainland, and finally culminated in the first social criticisms
he expounded when he moved to Taiwan. The result is series of three
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connected works, the composition of which occupied rouj:hly Mou's
first decade in Taiwan (Mou, 1952 1954 1960). Torethor, these
three books represent Moo's retrospection about Lind interpretation
on the cause of the Chinese crisis. Central. to his conceptualization
of the impending enigma is his discussion on the two existential realms
of man: the inner realm of sagehood, and the outer realm of polity.
As has already been noted, both the inner and the outer realms
are but the two essential dimensions of the neo-Confucian ideal. man.
In this formulation, the Confucian concept of ideal man can be expressed
in the form of a continuum, leading from the inner world of consciousness
to the outer world of experiences. Discrepancy between an individual's
different facets of life is avoided through their integration by a
strong moral impulse. And in neo-Confucianism, it is the Confucian
doctrine that will supply the source of this moral. impulse. When
this integration is reached, the individual would be morally adequate,
and capable of rendering his moral system from r bstrnic t principles
into concrete human affairs. The ideal man of a Confucian scholar is
therefore not an inert, introspective being, concerned with nothing
more than the trajectory of his own inner consci.ousne ss. Instead,
he must also be a man of the world., involving himself in concrete
daily interaction,.and giving an overt, palpable expression of moral
principles. The two realms of existence are thus inter-connected and
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inter - dependent, making up a man not only morally virtuous, but also
politically invincible .
Yet tidings of modern China have shown that , if anything,
China has been a politicalfailure . And for Mou , this is due exactly
to a discrepancybetween the inner and the outer realms . Development
in traditionalChinese culture has been one - - sidedlv biased towards
the ultivationof inner sagehood, yet failed to extend it into the
outer realm of polity . Nou maintains that the expressionof morality
and reason can take numerousforms . In traditionalChina , the
expressionhas been largely static and introspective. It is necessary
to render this particularmode of expressioni to what he calls con -
struct expression
This way , morality and reason could become establishedas value systems
in the different dimensionsof life , which would serve as the subterranean
connectionsamong different facets of life , and at the same time
provides the source for the respectiveautonomyof these facets .
By thus maintaining, Mou Tsung - San is in fact arguinghis case
against the style of scholarshippopular among the Ching intellectuals.
While orthordox Confucian doctrine stresses the inter - dependenceand
continuityof the inner and the outer , this belief has been cornitinually
and extension expression
（ 結 構 表 現 ）
（ 外 進 表 現 ）
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distorted , resulting in a split in the road from inner cultivation
to outer practice . These distortions become especially pronounced
in the Ching dynasty , resulting in a confrontationbetween the two
schools of textual commentary
and the great popularityof the former . The flowering
of academic hermenuenticwork , is especiallyconduciveto the develop -
ment of an unreflective scholarship , obsessed with academic hermenentic
for its own sake , without being able to connect the intellectual
pursuit with the more practical affairs of the world . Both the
inner and the outer realms suffereda set back as a result . Thus ,
when China was confrontedwith the Western powers during the late
Ching , it was the very time when her culture spirit was suppressed
to a minimum. Both the moral consciousnessof man and its outward
manifestationn the real world had become weakened and undermined.
Implicitly, therefore, Mou ' s belief is that only if the discrepancy
between the inner realm of sagehoodand the outer realm of polity
can be reconciliated, can China develop the set of values like domocracy,
science , and social administrationand implementationwhich would
enable her to reestablishherself in the modern world and against
the Westernpowers .
( 考 據 ) versus textual theorising
（ 義 理 ）
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Thus, on identifying this discrepancy of realms as the root
of China's weaknesses, Mou's question is: how is it possible that
these two realms can be reconciled so that ultimately science and
democracy can be developed from indigenous Chinese civilization?
In other words, central to Mou's thought is, again, the belief that
indigenous Chinese civilization has in it the key to the crisis of modern
China. The solution to the present chaos thus cannot and should not
be sought from an imitation of the west. Instead, it could be realized
only through a revival of the geist of Chinese culture. This is the
conviction which guides him in his search to unravel the problems
facing China. From this point of departure, it is possible to follow
Mou's path and see how he argues for his key to the riddle.
Even when he was still undergoing his apprenticeship in
philosophical training, Mou had realised that in China, aside from
the dominant tradition of moral philosophy, there also existed a
subterranean current of rational philosophy, emphasising the role
of logical and rational thinking rather than moral choices or
values. This tradition has been all along suppressed by the Confucian
main current, yet it can nevertheless be identified in early classics
such as the I-Ching, and it manifested itself mainly in astronomical
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tcalculations or in political rhetoric. The development of philosophic
thought in China has been very much biased towards moral. philosophy,
resulting in the deemphasis of ideas more relevant to the practical
side of life. For Mou, this confrontation between moral philosophy
and rational thinking is, again, one of the manifestations of a
discrepancy between the inner and the outer realms of human existence.
The neglect of rational thinking thus denotes the same emphasis on
inner enlightenment at the expense of the practical affairs of the
world. Mou thus ventures to suggest that, in order to make a bridge
between and resolve these two realms of existence, the key must be
in the revival of the rational tradition of Chinese culture. The
under-development of rational logical thinking is the one fatal
vulnerable spot in Chinese culture. This explains Mou's intense
interest in the study of logic.
However, Mou does not deal with logic in the spirit of the
then dominant logical-Positivists, who maintains a sharp break
between logic and metaphysics, and discard the latter in favour of
the former. Mou's position is that, if logic is to be meaningful
at all, it has to be somehow connected to the more fundamental planes
of human existence. Contrary to the logical-Positivists' dictum of
logic without metaphysics", No suggests that it is from metaphysics
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that the meaning and relevance of logic could be ultimately aerlvea.
This, one could readily see, is a position analogus of Edmond Husserl's
construction of a transcendental logic. If the logical plane and the
metaphysical plane could become synthesized, then implicitly, the two
traditions of ratio,ial and moral thinking in Chinese culture could be
likewise reintegrated. This can be taken as the intellectual foundation
of the system of Mou.
When looking at this problem more specifically in the context
of Chinese culture, Mou develops his view of the three traditions,
scholastic traditionmoral tradition
(MOU, 1960). These three traditions represent
political
the most fundamental components of an adequate, balanced cultural
growth. According to thou, however, the one defining characteristic
of Chinese as opposed to western culture is exactly the differential
emphasis placed on these three traditions, which consequently leads
the development of these two culture far apart from each other. In
the western world, the moral tradition is underdeveloped in favour of
the political tradition and the scholastic tradition. While both
democracy and science spring from the western world, and represent
high achievement in politics and scholarship, western culture
nonetheless lacks an autonomous moral tradition, the inadequate
tradition
（ 道 統 ）
（ 政 統 ）
（ 學 統 ）
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substitute for which is religion. In China, the contrary is true,
the moral tradition is so highly developed that it overwhelms
both scholarly endeavour and political administration. Mou maintains
that these three traditions are mutually supportive. Though he
concedes that morality stands on a higher plane of existence,
scholarship and politics are nonetheless concrete manifestations
of this morality. The problem of western culture is therefore the
lack of moral support behind a highly developed, world of concrete
affairs. This lack is partially covered-up through the functioning
of religion. When left to himself, however, the individual is
incapable of going beyond concrete categories like science or
democracy, and getting in touch with more essential aspects of
existential values. In China, morality is singularly stressed. The
management of real life is only taken as a temporary expedient, and
as such has not been systematically developed. To search, for moral
realization thus becomes the prime motive of life in traditional
China. In this way, the culture of China is unable to develop
practical principles for resolving problems arising from the objective
world and daily reality. The use of intellect or power is always
connected with the higher plane of morality, and no autonomous system
of scholarship or politics is possible. The problem facing China
then, is how to revive the scholastic tradition and the political
tradition.
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Two implications may be drawn from Mou's discussion of the
three traditions. Firstly, he manages to pin down more clearly the
relationship between morality and rational thinking 0 the first being
moral knowledge and the second instrumental knowledge. Scholarship
and politics represent the acquisition and implementation of this
instumental knowledge. This tradition of instrumental knowledge is
by no means absent in traditional China. its existence, as Mou
demonstrated,. can be readily detected in the ancient classics or
among the astronomers of traditional China. The problem is to free
this instrumental knowledge from the hegemony of morality, and to
provide intellectual as well as existential justification for the
further development of instrumental knowledge, and develop from it.
China's own version of science and democracy. Following from this
line of argument, the second implication is on the problem of so-
called westernization in China. If westernization has proved to be
a name welcomed by some, and hateful to others, for Nou it is but a
misnomer. For, since the three traditions are the basic components
of both Chinese and Western cuultures, then the substantiation and
realization of these traditions is an aspiration shared by both
cultures. It is thus meaningless to designate the development of
science and civilization in China as We sternizat Lon, for it is an
intrinsic and inevitable development of Chinese culture. When it
becomes necessary to shift her emphasis from the higher to the
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everyday plane of existence, China is following her predetermined
path of cultural growth. Westernization is thus a misnomer, in
the same sense that the growth of moral consciousness in Western
society cannot be described as Sinicization. In maintaining this
argument therefore, Mou not only provides a diagnosis of the current
state of crisis facing China, but also manages to solve the highly
sensitive and value-laden question of westernizat ion. The debate
over how far China should be westernized is a misplaced question.
In order to render a set of instrumental knowledge applicable
to Chinese culture, Mou maintains that both the political tradition
and the scholastic tradition are inseparable from the dependent on
the moral tradition. And if the tradition of morality in China has
been based largely on the concept of benevolence
development of instrumental knowledge is to render it practicable.
Mou thus formulates his concept of practical benevolence
Morality therefore becomes the criteria upon which to construct the
scaffolding of the everyday world, and benevolence is the underlying
principle which diffuses from the realm of high morality into mundane
everyday affairs. And, if i ndivi dualc in their everyday life are able
to practice the rule of benevolence, they will also be in possession
of superior moral consciousness.
（ 仁 ）
（ 踐 仁 ） .
the key to
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Thus, in attempting to state more specifically the nature
of the relationship between morality and practice, Mou is suggesting
that the cultural crisis of China could be solved by grounding the
outer realm of polity in inner sagehood. The question then becomes:
how to further develop the realm of polity without leading it away
from the underlying control of morality?
This is then the basic layout of Mou's problematic, and the
developments of his subsequent intellectual endeavours are but
attempts to substantiate, elaborate, and finally to resolve, this
set of problems which he regards as standing at the root of China's
crisis. His subsequent development follows roughly two different
directions. In the first place, he launches a full-fledged excursus
into the complicated tradition of Chinese philosophy, with the implicit
intention of demonstrating the moralistic nature of this tradition, and
establishing the orthodoxy of Confucianism. In the second place, Mou
seeks to prove the plausibility of his central argument, that it is
possible to establish an inner realm of sagehood over and above outer
experiences, and that it is possible for the inner and the outer realms
to interpenetrate into each other, so that the Confucian ideal man
could indeed be rendered into reality.
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Mou started his systematic excursus into Chinese philosophy
at around 1952, when he wrote a book dealing, with the politics and
philosophy of ancient China, up to the Han dynasty (MOU, 1952).
However, for Mou, this was still the period when a split between
politics and philosophy was absent. In dealing with this period then,
Mou's focus is on the political expression of the spirit of Chinese
history, with philosophical pursuits largely subjected to the influence
of the political climate. After the Han dynasty, however, the political
order of China never transcended the political system as evolved in
Han, and was largely standing still for the remaining years of Chinese
history. At this juncture, philosophical thought became separated
from politics, finally leading to a split between inner sad ehood and
outerpolity. From Han onward, the development of Chinese culture has
been singularly concentrated on the cultivation of inner sagehood, at
the expense of other more mundane pursuits.
From 1952 onward, Mou writes a aeries, of studies of the main
currents in Chinese philosophy, including Taoism, Chinese Buddhism,
and neo-Confucianism (Mou, 1963 1968 197,). Together, these works
constitute more or less an analytic history of Chinese philosophy.
From these works, the essential tenets and assumptions of Chinese
philosophy are unravelled, thereby specifically pinning down the
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profile of Chinese culture. If Mou has dealt separately with Taoism,
Buddhism, and Confucianism, he nevertheless contends that Confucianism
is overwhelmingly the main current of Chinese thought. Both Taoism
and Buddhism are but diversions, which were ultimately absorbed back
into the Confucian mainstream, at the same time enriching it with
new innovations. In this way, Taoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism
are not, as many writers, especially the anti-Confucian iconoclasts,
are prone to suggest, three equally important, parallel developments
of the Chinese mind. Instead, Taoism and Buddhism are but temporary
digressions, inevitable exogeneous or endogenous challenges which
nevertheless did not alter the essence of the Confucian main stream,
and the latter's status as the backbone of Chinese culture. Thus,
when Mou approaches the history of Chinese philosophy, his representa-
tion is highly interpretative, attempting to read new insights into
this history, and eventually to establish the legitimacy of Confucianism
as the embodiment of the Chinese cultural spirit.
From the study of Chinese philosophy, Mou showed that when a
philosopher in traditional China formulated concepts like the inner
realm, sagehood, benevolence, etc. these concepts are not merely
heuristic devices devoid of content and reality. In other words,
Mou endeavours to ground these concepts onto an empirical, concrete
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foundation, to show that the glamorous and elaborate conceptual
systems constructed by the philosophers of China are not word plays.
The question he addresses is: if the outer realm of polity has to be
founded on the realm of sagehood, then upon what shoudl this inner
realm itself be founded? It is not sufficient merely to point out
the possibility of a more adequate outer realm of polity by seeking
its root in the inner realm, for this begs the more fundamental
question of the very possibility of the inner realm itself. It is
to settle account with this more fundamental issue that Mou, in
addition to his excursus into Chinese philosophy, launches another
excursus into Kantian philosophy, and come to the conclusion that, by
following the different paths in Chinese philosophy, it is possible
for the individual to attain the supreme act of cognition which Kant
has designated as Intellectual wisdom, and which he regarded as beyond
the capacity of common man, being instead only attainable by a
super natural God.
Thus, in Mou's system of thought, Confucianism and Kantian
philosophy finally converge and enlighten each other. By drawing
relevant threads from both Chinese.and European philosophy, 11-Nou is
able to spin a pattern of ideas which would unravell the problematics
of the Chinese crisis.
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The pursuit of Kant is an intricate one. He lays great
emphasis on the inherent limitation of human knowledge, that human
kind are bound by certain a priori categorical imperatives, and
consequently human knowledge can only penetrate what Kant designated
as the realm of phenomenon, or the world as perceived by man, and
not the realm of noumenon, or the world as it really is. For Kant,
human knowledge is unable to penetrate beyond the transient world
of human phenomena and grasped the authentic, external realm of
noumena. Only God, Kant proposed, is in possession of such knowledge
which he called intellectual wisdom. As for men, they have to resort
to their own arbitrations in establishing moral principles for the
human world.
If what Kant has argued is correct, human activities become
caught in the antinomies of subjective relativism, and the operation
of the human world cannot escape beyond the transience of human
phenomena. Tn this sense, it will be futill for Chinese philosophers
to talk about ontological concepts. like sagehood or benevolence, and
the systems of moral philosophy in China would lose their outological
foundation, and become merely arbitrary idea constructs. In the face
of this grim conclusion, Mou boldly asserts that Kant is correct only
in the context of the Ruropean philosophical tradition. Intellectual
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wisdom is indeed unattainable by man in the formulation of western
philosophies, yet the acquisition of it is exactly provided for in
Chinese philosophy. Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism each in
its own way enables the human actor to transcend the straitjacket
of Kantian philosophy and catch hold of this intellectual wisdom.
For Mou then, his excursus into the philosophical tradition
of China makes a two-fold contribution. Specifically, it provides
the moral ground work upon which a practical scaffolding of socio-
political activities could be constructed, thereby serving to correct
the one-sided development of traditional Chinese culture. More
generally, in order to establish the authenticity of this moral
groundwork, Chinese philosophy also provides the paths to overcome
the inherent limitations of human knowledge and realise the authenti-
city of being. Together-, these two levels of operation make up the
full implication of Mou's contention that if the outer realm of
polity is to be grounded on the inner realm of sagehood, the inner
realm itself can only be grounded upon the acquisition of intellectual
wisdom, and what's more, this acquisition is wholly plausible if the
paths of Chinese philosophy are followed.
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The argument for the accessibility of intellectual wisdom
is embodied in Mou's more recent works (MOY, 1971 1975). The
basic. reasoning of his argument is quite clear, that if the horizon
of human knowledge is restricted by certain a priori categorical
imperatives, this does not necessarily render the transcendence of
the phenomenal world impossible. For knowledge and reasoning
represent only a portion of the entire faculty of human cognition.
Granted that the limitation of knowledge is genuine, the question
is whether provisions can be made so that a path bypassing knowledge
and reason can be found, and which would lead to the transcendental realm
of noumenon. For Mou, the rational tradition in Western philosophy
has been so dominant that Kant and his followers were unable to
realize that other paths to transcendence can be found besides
knowledge and reason. It is exactly in the absence of such a tradition
in Chinese culture that philosophers in traditional China have been
able to achieve the suposedly impossible.
Whether in Confucianism, Taoism, or Buddhism, traditional
Chinese philosophers always make a careful. distinction between wisdom
derived from knowledge, and wisdom inspired by virtue. And in China,
the role of reason-and knowledge is played down in favour of a certain
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more ontological life-philosophy. In this sense, the point of
departure for Kant is very much the same as that of the Chinese
philosophers: they both start from a recognition of the limitation of
human knowledge. Yet as Kant found this limitation a fatal obstruction
in the attainment of authentic being, Chinese philosophers simply
derived from it the necessity to give up knowledge as an adequate
philosophical weapon in favour of other more adequate tools. When
Kant stopped dead before the blind alley of knowledge, Chinese philosophies
simply switched to other paths. In this sense, Confucianism, Taoism,
and Buddhism can be described as similar efforts to bypass the limitation
of knowledge, and develop their own ways to more authentic experiences
of life.
For confucianism, the reception of knowledge and information
through physical, sensory organs only provides the individual with
more trivial and crude knowledge of the world. The attainment of a
higher wisdom could only be achieved not through ears and eyes, but
through operations of the mind and heart. The phenomenal world is
indeed the only world accessible to our sensory organs, and the inherent
make up of these organs conditions the form and nature in which the
phenomenal world becomes accessible to us. For the more authentic
world of noumena, Confucianism postulates that though it may be byond
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the immediate access of sensory organs, it may nevertheless be sought
through intuition, or an immediate act of the human mind. In this
intuitive act, the world is not divided between object and subject,
and the individual does not approach it through categories of thought.
For this intuition to be possible, the mind must not be distorted or
constrained by either human emotions or phenomenal knowledge. This
explains the great emphasis of the neo--Confucians on the nurturing
of an undistorted mind or unbiased cognition. If the mind is free
from the constraints of phenomenal knowledge, it is consequently
also free from the constraints of thought categories. When the
individual does not approach the world through reasoning and thought,
the restraints of categorical imperatives become obsolete, and it is
therefore possible for the individual to apprehend the noumenal reality
of the world. And this reality, for Confucians, is but an embodiment
of benevolence. In their conceptualization, the immediate, intuitive
acts of men are also acts of benevolence. It can thus be derived
that the ontological structure of the human world is a construct of
benevolence, which is the true nature of the human world and the
metaphysical cosmos. The universe surrounding us is therefore a
moral universe, and, through an identification with our world, we
would become integrated into this universe, since both the human
world and the universe share the same benevolent structure. In this
way, temporal and spatial constraints also become obsolete, for
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underlying differences of time, space, or other conditions, flows
the same relentless force of benevolence. To recognise, and become
identified, with this force through intuition is thus the Confucian
road to a conquest of the phenomenal world, and to sagehood.
Taoism, on the other hand, while equally stressing the
importance of an intuitive mind in comprehending the nature of the
world, denise that this nature must necessarily be moralistic. What
Taoists stress is just the act of certain phenomenological reduction.
Hence, their assumption is quite the same as that of Confucianism,
that the mind, when free from the various obstructions of a phenomenal
world, may be able to comprehend the true nature of the world, but they
differ from Confucianism in their respective definition of the estrange-
ment of the mind from the authentic world. For Confucianism, only
knowledge contradicting the benevolence principle will estrange the
mind, education and socialization towards the path of benevolence
can therefore help the individual in developing his intellectual
intuition. Taoism, however, since it makes no assumption concerning
the nature of the world and universe, considers that any kind of
knowledge must be equally defective in distracting the mind from the
reality of universe. The Taoists make a distinction between to have,
and have not. For them, to have anything endowed in the human mind,
leads it astray into estrangement, and. this holds true even for
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moralistic and virtuous teachings. For the Taoists then, the mind
must have not, one must forget and discard all experiences into
oblivion. This often involves lengthy self-searching meditations
or introspection. In a true state of nothingness, the nature of
every creature would naturally become exposed to the human mind.
And since Taoism makes no pretension to moralistic missions, the
relationship between the mind and the authentic world becomes
basically an aesthetic one. The mind being at one with nature,
it is therefore free from any possible worldly constraints and also
free to appreciate the authentic nature of the universe. This
already is where the highest goal of man lies, and the Taoists do
not find it necessary to talk about further moral responsibilities.
In comparison, Buddhism is more distinctive in its treatment
of the so-called noumenal reality. From its very fundamental principles,
Buddhism has rejected any distinction between a phenomenal or an
authentic reality. For Buddhism, the world is, in the final analysis
constructed upon a void, and to this emptiness it will ultimately
return. Buddhism therefore rejects the contention that things have an
intrinsic nature, or that beyond the phenomenal level, we can discover
r
an unchanged, noumenal level. Instead, Buddhism stresses that every-
thing, every creature, is a product dependent upon the accidential
interaction of conditions. As such, to talk about the autonomy and
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authenticity of being is meaningless. The world is but a coinclaenzaL
matrix of interdependent conditions and products, which serves
simultaneously as condition of some, and products of others. Behind
and beyond this level, instead of a certain ontological force of
benevolence or true nature of things, there is but an immense void
of emptiness. There is thus no sustained or eternal meaning in
this universe which individuals could aspire towards. The only
meaning in existence is to get away from existence altogether, to
escape into nirvana and avoid the suffering of eternal reincarnations.
As Buddhism stresses the fundamental nihilistic nature of the world,
it also suggests ways to recognise that nature and to ultimately submit
to it. It is the differences in interpreting this nothingness and.
the final submission which give rise to the many different streams
of Buddhist thought. Among these, Mou Tsung-San places especial
emphasis`on the Tien-Tai Sect （天台宗） taking its doctrine as
the most exhaustive of Buddhist thought.
Whether discussing Confucianism, Taoism, or Buddhism, therefore,
Mou suggests that they all provide ways for the individuals to go
beyond the limitations of his knowledge or other cognitive faculty, and
then grasp a more eternal, profound meaning of existence even within
the compass of his limited being. True to his Confucian calling, Mou
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himself rejects the positions of Taoism and Buddhism as passive
and unconstructive, yet he sees that, not withstanding these
weaknesses, they do succeed in giving their own coherent interpreta-
tion of the conquest of the phenomenal world. From this, discussion
of the relationship between intellectual wisdom and Chinese philosophy,
Mou has succeeded in pushing philosophical discourse to its extremity,
and solving problems at an existential level. From this demonstration
of the possibility of intellectual wisdom, the inner real of sagehood
has attained its ontolgoical foundation upon which the outer realm of
of polity could likewise be constructed. And the implication of Mou's
thought must not be for Chinese culture alone, but through the
revitalization of Chinese culture, it may become a timely answer to
the more general problems of humanity at large.
CHAPTER FOUR
Chien Mu ( 钱 穆 )
The case of Chien-Mu ( 钱 穆 ) supplies the present stucy
with the third, and the last of its three motifs- HistoryThe
present chapter will describe how an historian has started from his
specific academic territority and develops ideas which illuminate
the present crisis of China as a whole. Together with Tang Chun-1
and Mou Tsung-San, the central concern which underlines the career
of Chien-Mu has to do with the cultural crisi facing China. And
while Tang and Mou have approached this crisis through their respective
cultural and philosophical. diagnosis, Chien-Mlu has taken the path of
historical studies. If Chien Mu has placed his attention on the Chinese
past, he is nonetheless motivated by a serious concern with the present.
Behind the image of an impartial discoverer of historical details
lurks a stron sense of nationalism.
Chien Mu has recently produced a monumental study on Chu Hsi
( 朱 熹 ) -the guardian saint of neo-Confucianism, who has been
hailed as the most important Confucian sage, after the Master himself
only. The work occupies five thick volumes, with some two million
words (CHIEN, 1971). It may be stretched to deduce from this monumental
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effort any unconscious identification on Chien Mu's part with Chu
Hsi himself, yet this work does suggest a frame of analysis which
may be equally applicable for an analysis of Chien Mu's mind. In
this study of Chu Hsi, Chien Mu breaks down Chu Hsi the moral
philosopher into two dimensions- the scholar and the intellectual.
The scholastic dimension being concerned with impartial academic
endeavours, e.g. like Chu it si's authoritative annotation of the
Confucian minor classics: The Four Books. The intellectual dimension,
on the other hand, concerned more with the thought and opinions of
Chu Hsi, in his capacity as a more self-conscious, reflective
personality- an example may be his Thoughts in Things at Hands.
These two lines of enquiry provide the basic framework upon which
Chien Mu may reconstruct the true picture of Chu Hsi the Confucian
saint. This same procedure may be followed here for Chien Mu the
historian. And, just as Chien Mu has emphasised more on the intellectual
rather than the scholastic side of Chu Hsi-, the same emphasis will
be observed here to bring out the more contemporary and socially
relevant implication of Chien Mu the historian. For the purpose
here, therefore, in the thought of Qhien Mu, the scholastic dimension
is in fact subordinated to and supportive of the intellectual dimension.
The scholastic works of Chien Mu might be further subdivided
into two main categories: (1) Classical studies, and (2) Historical
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studies. These two main kinds of work are directed respectively
to the unravelling of two problems. Firstly, to reconstruct the
true picture of orthodox Confucian tradition and locate its relative
position to other streams of thought. Secondly, to reconstruct
the true picture of the Chinese past, and to demonstrate its
relative strengths and weaknesses. The answering of these problems
would serve to prepare a more concrete grounds upon which Chien Mu
in his capacity as an intellectual could formulate his opinion and
assessment.
In the field of classical studies, Chien Mu' s more famous
works include a chronological account of the pre-Chin philosophers
(CHIEN, 1935) a chronological biography of the flan scholars Liu-
Hsing and Liu-Yin (CHIEN, 1930) an explanatory account of the Four
Books (CHIEN, 1953), etc. Of these works, the first two especially
merit discussion. The first work attempts to provide a more reliable
chronological mapping of the pre-Chin philosophical thought, a period
simultaneously regarded as both the most fascinating and mazy in the
entire philosophical tradition of China. By carefully comparing
materials containing in both orthodox history and other accounts,
and by incorporating newly found materials during the late-Ching
period, Chien Mu has been able to correct a wide range of the more
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widely shared misconceptions as concerning the and works of
the pre-Chin philosophers, and the relative positions these
philosophers occupied in relation to each other. This way, the
general intellectual context against which Cori. fucianicm was first
germinated and spreaded could be established with greater credubility.
The chronology of the Han father and son scholars, Liu Hsieng and
Liu Yin, on the other hand, concerned with the solution of the deep-
rooted controversy between the New Text school and the Old Text
school of Confucian classics. Specifically, it serves as a counter
attack against the New Text scholars as represented by Kang Yu-wei,
which has gained wide popularity during the late Ching. Kang derived
his ideological justification from underpinnings of the New Text school,
and sought to establish even Confucius himself as a social reformer,
or even a revoluntionary. Chien Mu especially takes issue with the
unscrupulous historical skepticism inspired by Kant, and sought once
again to free Confucianism from ideological manipulations.
When taken together, these two works give an illustration of
Chien Mu's effort in clarifying misconceptions, mystifications, etc.
in the development of Confucianism. The first work establishes an
intellectual map upon which relationship between Confucianism and
other pre-Chin philosophies could be assessed, while the latter work
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strives to clarify the internal conflict between different streams
of Confucianism. In this discussion, therefore, one can see that in
order to reconstruct an orthodox Confucian tradition, Chien Mu is
directing a war on two fronts. Firstly, it is necessary to establish
the specific position between Confucianism and other streams of
thought, and secondly, internal consistency within Confucianism itself
must be developed, so that an authentic picture of Confucianism could
be identified. Thus, these two works could be taken as largely
representative of Chien Mu the classicist, concerning primarily with
objective digging of facts and evidences. Yet from these pursuits,
Chien Mu lays his own ground upon which his other opinijons may be
expressed.
The second category of Chien Mu's scholastic work has to do
with the unravelling of various myths and riddles in troditional
Chinese history. Implicitly, the question Chien Mu addresses is:
what is the true face of Chinese history? It is only when this
question has been resolved that Chien Mu would be able to advance
his evaluation or defence of this history. Chien Mu' s most important
works in this regard are his outline history of China (CIIIEN, 1940),
and the history of Chin and Han (CHIEN, 1957). His outline history
of China is of course Chien Mu's most definitive representation of
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Chinese history per se. In terms of scope and horizon, this work
far exceeds the boundary of a pure historical narration. Instead,
it embodies Chien Mu's conception of Chinese history and also his
implicit defence of this history. The message of this book as
something more than a purely historical work lies in its layout,
in the way Chien Mu meticulously selects his material and design.
his set up. Thus, the .narration assigns greater length, and therefore
greater emphasis, on the dynasties which are usually regarded as the
more representative eras of Chinese culture, such as Han, Tang, Sung,
and Ming. Only more casually does he deal with the times when China
was in an uproar, as in the Six Dynasties, the late Tang, or late
Ming. Also less stressed upon are the times when China was in. the
hand of foreigne. conquerors, as in the Mongol Yuan Dynasty, or in
the Manchu empire of Ching. In other words, the relative weight
Chien Mu assigns to each historical period in his narration is neither
according to the actual temporal durations these periods occupied, nor
according to the political dominance each has managed to exert. Instead,
the sole criteria is on the relative centrality each period occupied
in relation to Chinese culture. In this sense then, orthodox Chinese
history is but the history of an undistorted, unshadowed Chinese
culture as embodied within a particular historicity. All other
periods when this culture was violated were but moments of historical
transitions, including may be even the three hundred years of Ching.
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In addition, Chien Mu has also been meticulous in his choice of
words and names, The Tai Ping is designated as riot and the
revolters of late Ming as bandits. This also reflects the rigidity
of Chien Mu's conception as regards the nature of orthodox Chinese
history. In this outline history of China, therefore, Chien Mu
has sought to produce an account appropriate to his conception of
Chinese history. Whatever may be said of this "value-ladened"
version of Chinese history, Chien Mu does provide, if only for
himself and a limited follower, a criteria to define and assess what
should be regarded as orthodox Chinese history.
Thus, even when Chien Mu is considered in his capacity as an
academician, his scholarly works are written usually for purposes
wider than pure academic interests. As in the case of Chu Hsi, Chien
Mu's intellectual side looms large even in his scholarly work. This
discussion on Chien Mu as a scholar could thus serve as a natural
transition to a consideration of his more intellectual dimensions.
As a historian, Chien Mu's attention is concentrated on the
various aspects of the pattern of China's past. In what follows,
focus will be placed on some of his more important themes: (1) his
general conception of history; (2) his conception on the role of ideas
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in history, (3) his conception on the role 01 individual in history.
The first, and certainly one of the most important, theme
one could identify in the thought of Chien Mu has to do with his
philosophy of history. Chien Mu is first of all concerned with the
meaning of the historical past for the present, and specifically,
he intends to spell out the moaning and value of Chinese history
in the present moment of historicity. Relevant works in this regard
include a slim volume of lectures dealing with the spirit of Chinese
history (CHIEN, 1950), and also, once again, his outline history of
China. The former work especially succintly surnmarises the main
tenets he upholds as regard history in general and Chinese history
in particular. And in' launching his discourses on history, Chien Mu
first comes to formulate his conception of time.
Thus, in a spirit reminiscent of a Marcel Proust or Henri.
Bergson, Chien Mu eloquently argues for a more flexible conception
of time as appropriate for historical imaginations of various kinds.
For Chien Mu, time, when put back into the context of history, is both
a duration and an accumulation. He argues that the present stems from
a continuous unfolding of the past, and this continuity will extend
its course also into the future, often in oblivious of the desires
of particular individuals, but rather closely bound up with the
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culture of the people as a whole. In thus maintaining, therefore,
history becomes the mode of expression of the spirit of a particular
culture. History being the form, and culture its content. Together,
they constitute the life of the particular nation, tribe, or race
concerned. And, by virtue of the fact that historical time is
basically a continuum from the immemorable past down into the distant
future, it becomes meaningless to talk about the part and future as
though they belong somehow to other temporal dimensions in contradistinc-
tion to the present. By thus breaking down the water-tight chambers
between different moments in time, Chien Mu is therefore able to
assert that the meaning of certain particular acts or deeds is in
fact beyond the confine of moments of time, and are therefore in this
particular sense, permanent. In substantiating this largely Bergsonian
or Hegelian lines of reasoning, Chien Muz specifically derives his
rationale from the ancient I-Ching. He therefore discusses the
dialectic between change and continuity, that change in the part
would contribute to continuity of the whole, and that continuity of
whole would give more sustaining meaning to its composing parts,
even when these parts have ceased to exist materially.
From this highly metaphysical conception of time, Chien Mu
has raised the level of historical studies from academic pursuit to
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that of ontology. This, in a way, is Chien Mu's echo to Heidegger's
dictum that even being is time-bound. But for Chien Mu, time
signfies eternity rather than limitations. For any rListorical
moment therefore, the temporal bondage is unreal, which would be
obsolete once the actor has joined in with the life of the culture
and race he belongs, of which history is but an expression and
embodiment.
This line of reasoning has its immediate implications on
Chien Mu's reflections of Chinese history. For, if history is the
sole expression and embodiment of a culture and people, then it may
also serve as some kind of indicator of the state of a culture. The
more highly-developed, more autonomous a culture is, the greater will
also be its historical consciousness. In this sense, China, with her
five thousand years of written history, could indeed have claim to be
culturally most mature and well-developed as compared with other
nations of less historical consciousness. The supremacy of Chinese
culture is embidded in her prolonged history. What must be done,
therefore, is to revive this spirit of traditional Chinese culture,
not until then can an independent, antonomous Chinese nation be
expected to stand in the modern world.
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In thus stating his own philosophy of history, Chien Mu
deliberately takes issue with other conceptions of history the
validity of which he questions. Specifically, he deals with three
influential streams of historical thought, represented respectively
by Hegel, Spengler, and Marx. The criticisms on Hegel and Spengler
largely centered on their ignorance of Chinese history, and how they
seek to formulate a general philosophy of history by focusing on the
Continental picture only. Chien Mu's discussion of Marx, however,
is more.: interesting for the purpose here since, from a criticism of
Marx, consequently if also implicitly, one may gain some ideas in
Chien Mu's attitude towards ideology in Communist China.
Chien Mu rejects, firstly, Marx's unklinear evolutionism,
which seems to him concentrates solely, therefore also incorrectly,
on the morphological changes of social structure, and unduly neglects
the role of particular historical events like the rise and fall of
nations, the distinctiveness of cultural characters etc. Chien Mu
thus questions, what happens to history once Communism arrives, when
the flow of social changes become stagnated by this eternal utopia?
In addition to this rejection of Marx's evolutionist thought, Chien
Mu also found Marx materialism unacceptable. Thus, in his outline
history of China, Chien Mu constructs a three-folded scaffolding of
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society, which he considers would more honestly represent the
architecture of social structure. At the upper-most level of this
scaffolding stands politics and power, the manipul ati.on of which
for Chien Mu, will directly affect the specific manifestation of
historical events. At the lowest level of social structure, Chien
Mu places the techno-economic structure of society which, after Marx
but to a lesser extreme, Chien Mu recognises as f-onaamental in affecting
the outlook of a nation or era. Yet Chien Mu does not designate
either the political or the economic level as ultimately deterministic.
Instead, between these two levels stands the powerful mediations of
ideas and thought. In consonance with the Chinese preference for the
golden mean, Chien Mu is here reiterating Chinese intellectual's
traditional belief in the supremacy of knowledge and intellect in
orienting the paths of social progress. In such a formulation there
is little room for a Marxian economic determinism, and the infra-economic
structure, rather than determining, is itself shaped by, the in-between
ideological structure.
This consideration of Chien Mu's phi ioso,phy of history thus
shows on the one hand Chien Mu Is conviction in the supremacy of
Chinese history and, on the other hand, within this history, the
supremacy of ideas and thought as mediating mechanism. This general
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position of Chien Mu as a historian can be further elaborated by a
consideration of the second main area in Chien Mu's intellectual
concern, that from a discussion of how he deals with the history
of philosophy. Chien Mu's research into the history of Chinese
philosophy is important for it serves, on the one hand, as a
concrete example of how Chien Mu applies his historical analysis,
his particular conception of time and history, to a group of historical
events. Secondly, it also serves as a bridge from which Chien Mu moves
to study the role of individuals in history, how individuals could
come to understand the intrinsic nature of history and culture, and
thereby come to identify with them.
Quite a large portion of Chien Mu's work is related to this
area, yet his basic conception on the history of Chinese philosophy is
most revealingly examined in a small section contained in one of his
most important systematic work in this area (CHIEN, 1931). In a chapter
on the disputes and conflicts between the New Text school and the Old
Text school of classical studies in the Han dynasty, Chien Mu carefully
draws out the different assumptions and possible implications of their
respective stance. And, by way of conclusion, Chien Mu points out
that this struggle-between the New Text and the Old Text school may
be taken as a miniaturized representation of the entire history of
Chinese thought. The New Text school and the Old Text school, with
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their respective committment and emphasis on either the present
or the past of the Chinese philosophical thought, is but one instance
of a persistent dialectic between a committrent to L be past as versus
an opposing committment to the present. For Chien .10M, this dialectic
between present() and past (古) has always been the sub-
terranean morphology in the development of the Chinese thought. And
Chien fu's account of this development begins as early as with Con-
fucius himself. Thus, in the time of the pre-Chin era, Confucius
was taken aback by the c ulturai turmoil then prevailed, he thus
attempted to revive the rites and moral system of the Chou dynasty.
And from his effort stemmed the flowering of the pre-Chin philosophies.
This, Chien Mu maintains, is Confucius's battle against the present
by orienting back into the past. The era of Warring states saw the
rise of numerous philosophical schools attempting to break away from
dognmatic adherence to traditions. This is a combat against the past
for the construction of a new present. Down to the Han dynasty, when
the New Text school and Old Text school managed to replace Taoist
thought and became prevailing, both schools were in fact rejecting
Taoist thought and became prevailing, both schools were in fact
rejecting the chaotic present and once again reinstating the past.
At the end of Han,`when classical study was in its peak, skeptic
philosophers like Wang-Chung (工充) fought against the current
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vulgarizationof classics , providing another instance of combating
the past in favour of the present. From late Han to the Six Dynasties,
the quest for truth and being took the form of Buddhistpilgrim . mage ,
yet in essence, this is again a discontentwi h t } ie presentin favour
of more ancient , more sustainingmeanings. . After Buddhismbecame the
dominantcurrent in Sui and Tang , however, Zen Buddhism1 arise and
succeeded in simplifying the gradually stagnated system of Buddhist
thought- again a case of how the presentwon over the past . When
the Buddhist force became spent , intellectualsreverted back to
Confucianclassicalstudies and resulted in the rise of Neo - Confucic- inism ,
this is again a victory of the past over the present . Yet the intricate
system of Neo - Confucianism, if subtle and refine , is also unduly
complicated. In Ming dynasty, therefore, Wang Yang - Ming
simplifiedthe Neo - Confucianconstructinto his two main tenets of
moral cognition
is analogusto that of Zen Buddhism, and in both cases , the role of
the past was played down for the sake of the present . The decline of
Ming led to serious confusionsin styles of thought . In order to
provide intellectualswith orientations, Ku Yen - Wu
the dictum that Neo - Confucianismis but Classicism
this is to integratethe present back in to the past . From this
dictum sprang the profusion of classical studies in the Ching dynasty ,
which gradually led to the dominanceof purely acaderinic- hermenuetic
works . The Late Ching thus saw the revival of the New Text school ,
( 王 陽 明 )
（ 良 知 ） and moral praxis ( 知 行 合 一 ) . His endeavour
( 絕 學 即 理 學 )
（ 顧 炎 武 ） stressed
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upon which Kang Yu-Wei and Liang chi-chao feunded their political
reformism, which is again a conquest of the present over the past.
From then onward, the incessant rise of new intellectual tides have
again produced confusions among Chinese intellectual. They have thus
either looked backward into the Chinese past for inspiration, or
looked outward to European countries for orientation. Yet it may be
possible to deduce from the recurrent cycle of intellectual develop-
ment, Chien Mu maintained, that the next scene would again be a
conquest of the past over the present.
Thus, looking from the history of philosophy in China from the
specific perspective of a dialectic between past and present, Chien
Mu has given a vivid picture on the different stages of intellectual
development of China, and how these stages related to each other as
causes and consequences, or thesis and antithesis. In this sense
then, the long line of development in Chinese philosophy is not
accidental, but is instead following a clear pattern conditioned by
the respective domination of a committment towards the past or the
present. Implicitly, this may serve as an additional. argument on
Chien Mu's conviction of historical continuities. From this temporal-
dialectical interpretation of intellectual history, Chien Mu also
implicitly provides his justification for his nocturnal backward
journey into China'rs past. This is but a natural unfolding of the
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latest of the many dialectical stages he depicted. By using
historical hindsight then, the consecutive conquests of past and
present constitute a certain logical pattern which may be helpful.
for further investigation into the reality of China's philosophical
past or future.,
In providing general sweeps of characterjzation of history,
the Hegelian implications of Chien Mu seems to suggest that individuals
have been relegated to a passive, insignificant position, with the
logic which underlies events standing over and above their particular
intention or desires. Even in the earlier discussion of philosophical
history, the chief determinants of intellectuals' orientation seem
to be the impersonal logic of time rather than intellectual discretions
The problem then, therefore, Is to assign an appropriate role to the
individuals, whereby they could become involved in the operation of
historical processes, and not alienated from it. In order to give
solutions to this question, Chien Mu attempts to breakdown the rather
abstract notion of spirit of history which he is so fond of using,
and try to locate a more concrete relationship between the individuals
and history. And, in trying to give the spirit of history more sub-
stantive contents, Chien Mu defined it as, again like Tang Chun- I and
Mon Tsung-San, but a moralistic spirit.
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From Chien Mu, this definition of a moralistic spirits of
history as the distinctive spirit of Chinese history is formulated
in contradistinction to other historical spirits which he sees as
embodied in Western cultures. Of these he defines: (1) Spirit of
Individualistic-liberation, orginated from the Hellenic civilization
(2) Spirit of organized life, originated from the Romans, and (3)
Cosmopolitinism, originated from the Hebraic religion. The various
combinations of these three spirits become the foundations for the
various nations and cultures available in contemporary Europe.
For China, however, the spirit of history is moralistic,
expressing the urge of the Chinese people to attain perfection for
humanity as a whole. It embodies an ideal image of personal quality
which the Chinese people, regardless of their individual differences,
all aspire to reach. This moralistic spirit therefore becomes the
core of Chinese culture and history. History progresses along the
path of moral realization, for the individuals who constitute this
history also aspire to this same realization. Thus, in the formulation
of Chien Mu, if Chinese history has -a spirit the unfolding of which
could not be deterred by individuals, each individual nevertheless
contributes to the formation of this spirit. jet the objectivation
of this spirit in history requires the individuals to establish his
own self-conscious identification with this spirit of history. The
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question then is how the individuals could be made torecognise the
moralistic spirit as the true spirit of Chinese history and culture,
and how he may then acquire the ways to become identified with it.
And here, Chien Mu, like his new-Confucian colleagues, stresses the
importance of the sages in Chinese history on the one hand, and
Confucianism on the other. While individuals constitute the content
of history, the sages stand at the centre of the individuals. The
sages, through, their concrete embodiment of the moralistic spirit
and their deliberate influence over others, provides the linkage
whereby-the individuals could become connected to the spirit of
culture and history. The idea of a sage thus constitutes Confucianism°s
image of an ideal man. It is the highest state of existence which
everybody should strive towards, representing a perfect manifestation
of human nature. At various places of his writing, therefore, Chien
Mu has attempted to describe the kind of persons these sages are,
and the meanings they embody.
Deriving his analysis partly from Mencius, Chien Mu distinguishes
between three different types of sages, represented respectively by
three lengendary figures from ancient Chinese history. Thus, the
first typt are those sages who were able to take up responsible roles
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in society, and helped to ease the life of other people. They were
therefore motly public figures .corking either in the governmental
bureaucracy or in other private institution, always ready to lead
other people towards progress in their well-being. Secondly, there
were those sages who on the contrary refused to take up worldly
responsibility of any kind, who rather seek after his own personal
integrity and thus withholds himself from immoral.. distractions.
Lastly, there were the sages who look for a harmonious relationship
between himself and his world. They therefore neither completely
involve in nor escape fromthe world of daily life, but rather prefer
to drift along with the tidings of life, though at the same time
making sure that they maintain their distinct individualities instead
of being relegated to a passive response to circumstances. The sages
of responsibilities, sages of.detachment, and the sages of harmony
are thus those figures who embody within themselves the moral spirit
of history and culture. For Chien Mu, these three different styles
of sagehood also constitute three different styles of life attitudes.
If these attitudes can be carried to an ideal level, all of them can
provide roads into sagehood. In this sense then, the idea of a sage
is a realistic one, which stands in a particular relationship to the
world of daily life. Moreover, it is to be realised in everyday life,
not through contemplative speculation of any kind.
116
For Chien Mu, even among the sages, each has gone into
different depths along the road of sagehood. And, looking at
the different sages in Chinese history in this licht, Chien Mu
describes Confucius himself as the most perfect embodiment of all
the qualities attributable to a sage. Thus, while he has depicted
three different paths to sagehood, these paths are simultaneously
converged into the personality of Confucius himself. Confucius was
therefore able to handle the complexities of the human world by
making use of all of these paths, which render him a sage of incom-
parable moral qualities. Thus, he is not only able to be a sage
himself, he is moreover able to pass on his experiences on to his
disciples. Thus depicting, he is therefore the highest embodiment
of the idea of sagehood, a concrete example ought to be followed by
the late comers of history.
This discussion of sages as standing in the core of the people,
mediating between history and man, is in fact closely related to Chien
Mu's discussion of ideas as mediating between different structures of
society. Sagehood is but a superior kind of ideas, and it mediates
between realms more abstract than economy and politic. Sage can
therefore be described as a superior intellectual group. This is so
especially when we put back Chien Mu' s discussion of sagehood into
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the general context of his thought. The idea of a sage more often
than not refers to people who are both learned and virtuous, in
the various examples Chien Mu uses as illustration, his heros are
mostly famous figures of the Confucian tradition, who were both
moralistic and well-versed in intellecutal undertakings. These
intellectual sages could help to systematize the knowledge and
training of a sage, thus making the road to sagehood more palpable
From this discussion of sagehood then, Chien u has managed
to tie in individual human action with certain abstract spirit of
history. It is not surprising to see that he again designates
Confucius as the greatest of all the sages, since he looks at this
spirit of history in moralistic terms. The individual actors, by
connecting themselves with a spirit and a life broader and profounder
than their limited beings, are therefore able to attach more enduring
meanings to existence thanis otherwise possible. This way, Chien tau
has also proposed his way to a transcendence of the transiency of
the individual and his world.
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CONCLUSION: Idea, Moraliy, and ReallLy
Metaphorically, the above discussion is drawn in the form
of a three-pointed star, with the three points of culture, philosophy,
and history embracing the central problem of cultural and political
revitalization, at both the general level of humanity and the more
limited level of China's crisis. In the present study, the representa-
tion of this star of revitalization can only be a partial one, and it
covers largely the Confucian side of the story. Thus, the three
figures who serve as concrete embodiment of this theoretical layout
share the fundamental position of being fervent Confucians. And,
each in ways appropriate to his own trainin, icademic interest, and
temperamental inclination, offer their differential tracks to the
Confucian road of salvation. Implicitly, the comprehensiveness of
their theoretical scope serves to prove that Confucianism, Like the
Marxism whichit has tried so hard to combat, can indeed be a total
world view, and as such, could possibly serve as the foundation for
an alternate way of life.
To bring out the distinctiveness of New Confucianism as a
socio-cultural current in the contemporary era, it may be possible
to summarise its stance as follows: that it is a socio-culture current
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which is formally distinguished by both a committrnent to the past
and a deep concern for the present, while substantively it is
characterized by an unfaltered faith in the superiority of Chinese
culture, as epitomized in the various tenets of Confucianism. By
referring either to the formal or the substantive side of their
thought, we may come to a more sympathetic appreciation of the
different opinions uttered by each of these individual figures.
Thus, in the last chapter we discussed at some length Chien
Mu's version of historical evolutionism. This stress on the continuity
of historical sequences in fact stands at the heart of New Confucianism
for it renders their simultaneous committment to both the past and
the present non-contradictory and wholly sensible. This line of
reasoning may also be taken as their answer to the iconoclasts of
various ideological leanings. For if, as they have argued, history
is a continous and inevitable unfolding of a certain cultural spirit,
then every moment of historicity must necessarily relate to each other
according to the inner logic of history. In this way, it will be
impossible to maintain that any one historicity is irrelevant to any
other moments of r[istory. We must therefore seek out the. relevance of
the past for the present, and try to discover the greater task which
both together are attempting to realise. Standing behind their belief
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in historical continuity is a more deep- Seated belief in the
existence of a certain cultural and historical "life" over and
above individual existence. The New Confucians seek fervently to
reveal this life as the highest goal possible f or human beings, and
they condemn those who have been sufficiently naive to maintain
otherwise.
This morphological structure of their thought thus requires
the New Confucians to seek out the nature and content of this autonomous
cultural life, and this they strive towards, by way of Confucianism.
Substantively speaking what the New Confucians derive from and also
feed back into, Confucianism is basically a moral ontology and a
cultural self-defensiveness. By evoking the idea of benevolence and
virtue, they have put forward an internally consistent argument in
favour of a moral ontology that the universe, including its creatures,
is moralistic in nature, and this therefore holds true for the lives
of men and their culture. By adhering to the principle of benevolence,
an individual may therefore hope to incorporate his limited being into
the much wider life of culture and universe. Since they stress in an
a priori manner the moralistic nature of the universe, and they also
consider Confucianism the highest moral system available, their
natural conclusion 'is therefore to place Confucianism above any other
systems of beliefs, whether sacred or secular. In this sense, Confucianism
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and its epitomization in Chinese culture become the final answer
to the random sufferings which every belief system seeks to explain.
Thus, from the formal and the substantive cormittments of
New Confucianism, there stem roughly three central tenets, dealing
respectively with a historical evolutionism, a cultural self-
defensiveness, and a moral ontology. By putting forth these tenets,
the New Confucians have been able to provide their solutions for
the problems they are concerned with. In summmarising the common
tenets shared by them, we must ask, if New Confucianism can indeed
be an alternate way of life, how great is this possibility? And
what is its viability in confronting other competing systems of thought?
As a system of thought which strives to effect practical,
social consequences, the actual influence of New Confucianism must
still wait to be seen. A time lapse will be necessary before these
ideas become diffused into the general socio-cultural dynamics, and
not until then may its overall strengths and weaknesses be assessed
Be that as it may, though it may be premature yet to assess New
Confucianism in terms of triumphs or fb i.luare, etc. it may
be helpful for us to ponder on its more obvious characteristics,
and try to see where its possible weaknesses lie.
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At the outset, it may be ovserved that the ways in which
these New Confucians philosophize are themselves highly intuitive
and impressionistic. Whether their lines of reasoning could be
accepted thus depends very much on the convincing power of their
discourses, instead of on how they support themselves with legitimate
evidence. In attempting to find out the possible weaknesses of
their thought, therefore, one way to do it is to indicate those
places where they fail to convince. The situation here, however,
is very much analogous to that of an encounter between a religion
and its skeptical non-believers. A body of religious doctrine is
usually internally consistent, and wholly convincing to those who
would choose to believe but for the non-believers, though they may
still concede that the doctrines themselves are coherent, it is
quite possible for them to remain unconvinced. The difference between
a disciple and a non-believer hinges on a certain leap of faith,
an initial unconditional acceptance of some first principles. Once
the leap is made, and the principles accepted, then all the sub-
sequent doctrines could also become,.implanted as well. In more
strictly religious discourse, the initial leap of faith usually
has to dd with admitting the existence of a diety, expressed in the
form of a personified God or a supernatural force. No evidence in
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the ordinary sense of the word could ever prove or disprove the
existence of these higher beings, and whether the leap can be made
or the principles be accepted is grounded totally on a personal
choice. It is the purest form of wager, as Pascal has maintained,
where not the slightest hint or cue is available for the individual
as a holy gambler.
This analogy is an unusually close one for our present case,
for New Confucianism, as the above pages have shown, is in a very
real sense a secular religion, in that it purports to settle fundamental
questions of a basically religious nature on a secular plane, with
morality, benevolence, and virtue, serving as a sort of Confucian
holy trinity". The very basic question one could raise, then, is
whether one accepts that the ontological nature of the universe is
indeed a moralistic one. If this very fundamented tenet is accepted,
then the teleological explanation of history and the moral superiority
of Chinese culture may be subsequently established. This, in fact,
is the original problem of Kant, that if a certain absolute coordinate
can be established in the ever-changing facade of the universe, then
this absolute will be the key to metaphysical reality. Kant himself
is unconvinced of the existence of any such absolute, but not the New
Confucians who claim to have transcended him. Thus, in the same sense
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that admitting a supernatural diety's existences would provide some
kind of instant solution to the mystery of life, admitting that the
universe is, a priori, moralistic could also serve to simplify and
unravel the complexities of existence.
For the New Confucians, therefore, morality is the axiom,
yet for the non-Confucians, it must only be but a postulate there
is no easy choice. Emile Durkheim, himself a sceptic about religion,
is nevertheless deeply convinced of man's intense need of a religious
sentiment. Yet what renders him a non-believer is this reluctance of
his to accept as an axiom what scientifically speaking must be merely
a postulate. The same case applies to Freud, who admits the indis-
pensibility of religion, yet at the same time condemns it as a public
neurosis. In this sense then, the New Confucians could also be
described as attempting to construct certain first principles for the
fulfillment of this religious need.
The effort behind this endeavour is respectable yet for a
non-believer, there are indeed places where the convincing power of
the New Confucians seem to be at its weakest. In posing the ideal
of sagehood as the.highest goal in life, for instance, this ideal.
is nevertheless only described in highly abstract terms. If, as
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they maintain, the ideal of sagehood is realistic, they have not
adequately clarified the concrete content of this ideal when put
back into the context of reality. Granted that a sage can become
identified with the universe, yet what practical consequence will
this have on the sage as a person? If sagehood is a more moralistic,
therefore superior, state of being, what difference will it make to
the concrete specific details of the way an individual leads his
living? In other words, if sagehood can be an alternative and higher
way of living, then how can this way of living become operationalized
in the context of reality? When these New Confucians deal with their
future utopia of sagehood, they do so in a spirit quite similar to
Marx's description of his Communist utopia, where man goes fishing
in the morning, and reads Plato in the evening. In both cases, the
utopias are depicted as abstractions devoid of specific content.
Thus, what specific change will there be in a man's real life if he
has become transformed into a sage, or what's the practical reper-
cussion for an individual if he manages to identify himself with the
"life" of his culture and his universe, these questions are left
answered. Moreover, in each crisc,' what maker3 tie szaffe l c style of
living necessarily a superior one? Supposedly, a sage will be able
to solve the fundamental puzzles of life, yet, again, aside from pure
theoretic reasonings, how this is practically possible is not
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demonstrated. This criticism of the sage as a personality type may
also be extended into the realm of sagehood as a transcendental
experience, where what particular experiences constitute this realm
are also not concretely put down.
This failure to pin down their ideas on to specific reality
is a general feature which can be seen in almost all the tenets upheld
by the New Confucians. Thus, for each of their argumnents, counter
arguments could be put forth with equal fervour and eloquence. The
situation is a dialectical one, in the original Kantian sense that a
metaphysical premise can always be contradicted by a equally convincing
but opposing premise. Kant has therefore found it necessary to query
the reliability of metaphysics as a philosophical discourse. This
same argument holds true for the New Confucians. If they are unable
to demonstrate the absolute necessity of their argument, they will
also be incapable of proving the falsity of other competing paradigms,
such as Marxism or various forms of iconoclasm. And to demonstrate
the absolute necessity of their arguments implies, among other things,
showing that they correspond to reality. Thus, Popper has rightly
maintained that what is true is corresponding to fact. In order to
be convinced of the truthfulness of the Confucian stance, the New
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Confucians must indicate to their audience that they are not dealing
with optimistic dreams or imaginations, but with a concrete world
of human affairs. It is this vital step which they have failed to
achieve, leaving their message in the form of a promise that, once
the message becomes accepted, the rest of the utopia will work out
all by itself. The failure here, however, has to do with a more
fundamental problem: how can metaphysics be supported by facts? In
speculating on the broad ontological assumptions of life and the world,
tke New Confucians, like other metaphysicians, are dealing with a realm
which supposedly transcends the mundane reality of facts, and in this
way the former could not be expected to correspond to the latter. It
is already philosophical common sense that systems of metaphysics
cannot be proved to be true or false, but they can only be accepted
or rejected. The New Confucians, in their attempt to ground a meta-
physical endeavour onto the secular world, aim at least implicitly to
break through this gulf which separates the metaphysical from the
factual. Yet it appears that they do not fare any better, and their
personal convictions about the practical value of their metaphysics do
not render the latter any more justifiable.
Theoretically speaking, therefore, the New Confucians have
indeed constructed a coherent paradigm and eloquently dealt with
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some of the most deep-seta Led problems of humLini ty, yet they seem
to assume a natural correspondence between theory and practice, and
have thus left most realistic difficulties unanswered. And if this
lack of concern with practical specificity has rendered New Con-
fucianism unconvincing at a general, ontological level, it can be
expected that this same weakness will make it even more unconvincing
at a lower, more pragmatic level. This can he better, understood if
we look at the socio-cultural dimension of the New Confucian problematic.
The New Confucians originally start from a fervent desire
with the socio-cultural crisis facing contemporary China. Looking
at the various aspects of their thought, how far can we say that they
have been successful? For Tang Chun-I, and Chien Mu the problem of
China could be solved only through the reawakening of the Chinese
cultural consciousness, that the Chinese people must come to realize
the value of the traditional culture. This, again, is to confront a
specific problem with abstract terms, and aside from the provision
of optimism and encouragement, both Tang and Chien fall short of
providing more specific lines of action. The. case of Mou Tsung-San
is more. interesting, for he specifically identifies the source of
China's crisis as a failure in the outer realm of worldly affairs.
His endeavour is therefore focused more narrowly on the ways to
dervive a stronger and more practicable realm of polity from the
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abstract realm of sagehood. However, if the realm of polity is to
be founded on sagehood, then Mou has found it necessary first to
demonstrate the viability of this inner realm, and this demonstration
occupies his entire career. Thus, though Mou realizes that it is
necessary for Chinese culture to grow outward as well as forward,
he himself goes inward and backward. At the practical cultural level
of the New Confucian paradigm, then, again not much more than sweeping
generalizations are available. We find these New Confucians constantly
discussing a practical. political problem in abstract metaphysical verbiage,
employing broad speculations to link up the two extremities of society
and ontology, and leaving all the in-between, middle-range considera-
tions in oblivion.
To interpret the particular meaning embodied in this intellectual
endeavour requires that we place this single instance in a more general
context of intellectual pursuits of various kind, and this, I propose,
could be done more effectively by borrowing some tenets from Max Weber.
Thus, Weber has suggested that the chief function of intellectuals is
the rationalization of world view. That intellectuals would help to
systematize and bring into consciousness the implicit values and norms
which the general public cherishes and shares without being conscious
of it. This Weberian notion of rationalization can prove to be highly
enlightening in interpreting intellectual pursuits which are socially
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relevant. For Weber, the main difference between the so-called
traditional society and modern society is the different types of
social actions these societies are based upon. Traditional society
is based on affective and traditional action, while modern society
is based chiefly on rational action. The problem of socialchange
and progress, therefore, is to effect a change from affective and
traditional action to rational action.In other words, how could the
kind of non-rational value systems cherished in traditional societies
become rationalized? Weber poses this problem,: as a two-fold one,
concerned respectively with the routinization of charisma and the
rationalization of world view. For a traditional society based on
custom and affectivity, a charismatic type of leadership prevails
which stresses the more personal, "sentimental" aspect of leadership.
And for Weber, the problem of social progress is how this charism could
become routinized in such a way that the leadership structure can
become autonomous from the leader's own personality make up. This
problem is another way of expressing the question of how a loosely.
knit world view may become a tightened, reorganized, or rationalized
view.
This Weberian line of reasoning can be readily applied to our
case here. In one way or another, the New Confucians could be looked
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at as chiefly concerned with the rationalization of the Confucian
world view, in that they attempt to systematize the various doctrines
of Confucianism, and to redeem into consciousness the implicit
relevance of Confucianism for everyday life. If, in the past, the
Confucian spirit was mainly manifested in a more personal, affective
manner, the New Confucians are attempting to transform this world
view into certain institutions. In other words, they are attempting
to routinize the charismatic glamour contained in the Confucian
tradition. This can explain the immense effort each New Confucian
has spent in cutting into the various complexities of the Confucian
idea system. For these New Confucians therefore, China's progress
in the modern world can be expected if Confucianism can become
rationalized.
Yet if it is indeed the goal of the New Confucians to rationalize
Confucianism as a Chinese world view, the above discussion has also
pointed out that the New Confucians have not been sufficiently systematic,
that they excel in providing sweeping generalizations yet neglect the
more pracatical considerations. How then can this failure be explained?
In order to tackle this inadequacy of the New Confucians, it
is necessary to look first at their attitudes towards Confucianism
132
as such. From the general picture depicted in the a fore-going
chapters, it can be easily seen that these New Confucians basically
look at Confucianism as an ideal, a supreme value. By stressing
the superiority of Confucianism as a value system, therefore, very
often the New Confucians refuse to condecend into mundane details.
Thus, for Weber, rational actions and rationalization are of two
different types, and he distinguishes between instrumental-rational
action and value-rational action. In this sense, New Confucianism
can be described as largely a value-rational. idea system, that it
develops an intricate set of highly rationalistic reasonings to
justify the supremacy of Confucianism as an ideal, a value, and
neglects the more pragmatic functions which a world view is expected
to fulfill.
What the New Confucian have failed to do, therefore, is to
depict Confucianism also as instrumental-rational actions. They have
not found it necessary to operationalize Confucianism for the societal
plane, where practical problems of existence are resolved. Even Mou
Tsung-San, who does stress the significance of political administration,
has not given much thought to how this may be realized. As examples
of value-rational action systems, Weber offers world religions of
various kinds, and New Confucianism, itself overwhelmingly value-rational,
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indeed comes close to being a religion itself, and as such necessarily
strays away from the real world.
If the cultural-political crisis of China. is to be solved,
it seems that a more instrumental-rational action system is necessary,
and unless this can be derived from Confucianism the New Confucians
would still fall short in claiming the practical viability of Con-
fucianism.
To look deeper into this problem, it might be said that, in
depicting Confucianism as a value-rational system, the New Confucians
have largely betrayed their original point of departure, which was
to provide a viable solution to the socio--cultural crisis facing modern
China. This point of departure obliges the New Confucians to search
for socially implementable solutions which are, however, beyond the
horizon of their intellectual competence. Their intricate excursus
into pure theoretical realms may thus be interpreted as some kind of
escape mechanism.
To put the argument this way is not necessarily to belittle
the immense effort these scholars have expended in attempting to
solve the various crisis facing China and humanity. Yet the above
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lines of criticism do point to a central paradox embodied in the
New Confucian stance, which these scholars are entangled in without
being able to escape. The paradox here referred to is the con-
tradiction between the two simultaneous goals of the New Confucians:
that they attempt to solve the cultural political crisis facing China,
and that they also attempt to solve the cultural crisis of mankind as
a whole. The point here is that these two goals in fact do not belong
to the same problematic, and it is not possible to have one solution
which could be adopted for both. The New Confucians' faith in the
omnipotence of their doctrine has made them unaware of this contradiction.
Instead, they more or less regard their two goals as naturally inter-
dependent. What I would suggest in this regard is that the respective
horizons of their goals have entailed that they are really different
types of problems. The Chinese cultural crisis is a specific one,
arising from a particular historicity and steming from a set of unique
political experiences. The kinds of solution it requires must therefore
be addressed to this specificity, that is it must be a solution which
can grapple with the whole series of highly particularized situations
constituting China's crisis. The crisis of humanity, on the other
hand, is a generalized question, which is embedded in some most
elementary aspects.of the nature of mankind as a whole, regardless
of culture and situation. To solve this crisis therefore requires
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solutions which can be addressed to certain aspects of the generalized
nature of men, a solution which grapples with human beings at an
abstract, universal level, and which would consequently deemphasize
the unique details embodied in any particular episode. Granted
that both of these solutions could be highly rationalized ones, they
belong respectively to the two categories of rational action pointed
out by Max Weber: that the former is instrumental-rational, while the
latter belong to what he calls value-rational.
In other words, to solve the particularized crisis of China
requires actions which would be instrumentally-rational, and that
the actions and solutions would be formulated in such a way that.
they could be readily applied to the situation of China, and directly
effect changes in the various facets of the Chinese crisis. The crisis
of humanity, however, stands close to being a religious question. It
deals with problems intrinsic to the nature of man, and as such is
necessarily not readily solved on the empirical instrumental,plane.
Instead, what could be effected is rather a change of attitude or
value with regard to men's relations with each other and the world.
It is in this sense that solutions of a religious kind would be
required for these problems, solutions which belong to the value-rational
category of Weber. There is therefore a contradiction between the
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specific and the generalized level of the New Confucian problematic.
Because they are scholars more well-versed in abstract vocabularies
and speculative thinking, it is therefore not surprising for us to
find these New Confucian constantly crossing the threshold of the
particular into the general.. On the one hand, their trainings have
made then powerless in actually designing a system of socio-political
processes which can be administered in the real world, while on the
other hand, by situating their problematic also on the more general
level of human being per se, it seemed to there that they could also
consequently solve the more down to earth problems once the crisis
of human being is removed once and for all. This belief may have
been quite mistaken, and indeed it is difficult to imagine the
situation where there can be interactions between social reality and
metaphysics. To solve the problem of China requires a set of social-
scientific tools, while to solve the problerriof mankind requires
ontological speculations. Yet one of our most important lessons
from the founding fathers of the modern social sciences, like Weber
and Durkheim is that social sciences and ontology have no point of
intersection, at least not in the world of social reality. In this
sense then, the New Confucians have become the captives of an impossible
position. Confucianism, in their formulation, would be both a religion
and an instrument, and they have no ideas about the difficulties
involves in this juxtaposition.
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The aforegoing lines of argument do not in any sense
exhaust the criticisms and evaluation one can make concerning New
Confucianism. What I have striven to point out is merely the more
obvious and possibly more significant difficulties embeded in it,
in relation to the ultimates goals the New Confucians themselves
have in mind. In the very beginning of this study, we have considered
some of the possible relations between an idea system and its immediate
socio-political milieu. If we take New Confucianism as a case in
point, we may indeed see that the weaknesses and difficulties we
have pointed out are in fact very much a product of their socio-
political situations. Thus, their earnestness in posing Confucianism
as simultaneously a universal road to salvation, as solution to.
China's crisis, as embodiment of a historical-cultural life etc., may
be interpreted as simply an over-reaction against the equally fanatical
glorification of Marxism in Communist China. Thi can be seen from
the fact that only after 1949 did these New Confucians embark on
their full-fledged defense of Confucianism and Chinese culture. Most
of their important exposition of Confucians and Chinese culture were
published' after 1949, a date when they gave up the role of pure
r
academicians, and assumed the more obsessing task of prophets of
doom. And, if we compare the New Confucianists with either the
Communists or the May-fourth iconoclasts, their differences have much
to do with their conception of history and time. For the New Confucians,
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progress lies in a continuation with our past, while for communism
etc., a sharp break with tradition is necessary before we can have
progress of any kind.
The New Confucians have thus placed their existential emphasis
on the past, and believe that from a correct knowledge of our past we
may derive a better future. Confucianism is part of our past, and
so are Chinese history and tradition. Before we can look forward to
our future, we must therefore look homeward to our past. In this
sense then, New Confucianism is very much a nostalgic social philosophy,
and it is from this nostalgia that most of its more characteristic
tenets can be accounted for. Implicitly, the ideas they so much
cherish give support to Marcel Proust°s dictum, that the real paradise
is the lost paradise. It is by referring to their specific conception
of history and time that we may be in a better position to understand
the spirit of this specific idea system, this intellectual phenomenon
which. goes under the name New Confucianism.
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